Meredith Kline on Circumcision and Sinai, Pt. 3 of 3

June 5, 2024 at 10:00 am (Circumcision, Covenant, Mosaic Law)

posted by R. Fowler White

With the considerations of our two previous posts (here and here) in mind, let’s now take up Kline’s assessment of the relevance of God’s administration of the circumcision covenant for his understanding of God’s administration of the Sinai covenant.

To our surprise, we find no indication that Kline addressed this topic, and this omission leaves a hole in his interpretation of the Sinai covenant similar to those that Murray left in his interpretation of Lev 18:5. In saying this, I recall the question by which Kline identifies a covenant’s governing principle: what is the function of the human party’s response of obedience in a given covenant, whether of works or of grace (KP, 318)? Hearing that question, we are prepared to follow it as far as it will take us. Before long, however, another question challenges us: who was “the human partner” at Sinai? No doubt, with Kline, we would answer that the human party at Sinai was without exception that of “the law-breaker kind.” We must say more, however, lest we ignore a key point that needs attention. That is, we all realize that among those law-breakers at Sinai was a remnant justified by faith as Abraham was and also others condemned in their sin. All those law-breakers at Sinai, then, were not of one kind. Nor was their response of one kind: the remnant’s response was consistent with the principle and surety of divine grace; the others’ response was consistent with the principle of works. These realities remind us of the scenario that Kline convincingly discerned in God’s administration of the circumcision covenant. They also prompt us to examine further how that administration might help us understand God’s administration of the Sinai covenant.

Reflecting on Kline’s omission, I would suggest that God administered the Sinai covenant just as He administered the circumcision covenant—which is to say that He administered it differently to the remnant than He did to the rest. As for the remnant, He dealt with them as He did with Abraham: according to grace. He did so because, consistent with the principle and surety of divine grace, the remnant responded to the Sinai covenant as law attached to the Abrahamic covenant of grace and thus as stipulations by which they were to show their faith in God as their surety. As for the rest, God dealt with them according to works because, consistent with the principle of works, they responded to the Sinai covenant as law detached from the Abrahamic covenant of grace and so as stipulations by which they were to secure benefits from God. From these observations, I would argue that we see the material relevance of Kline’s insights on God’s administration of the circumcision covenant for our understanding of His administration of the Sinai covenant. In fact, we recognize that, because there were two possible responses to the obligations of the Sinai covenant, there were also two contrasting but compatible principles at work in its administration. There was a principle consistent with the proper purpose of the Sinai covenant, and it was that of grace for those who had faith. Even so, since the Sinai covenant could not be reduced to its proper purpose, there was another principle for those who lacked faith, and it was that of works.

Conclusion. To the best of my knowledge, despite his insights on the dual administration of the circumcision covenant, Kline does not explore the applicability of that construct to his analysis of the administration of the Sinai covenant. This alternative approach may prove helpful, however, to those who subscribe to the Westminster Standards as Kline did. The construct offers a clear and simple explanation of the Standards’ twofold description of the law as a covenant of works and a rule of obedience (cf. WCF 19.2, 6; WLC 97). A dual administrative construct affirms that the administration of the Sinai covenant proceeded from the premise that, whether administered as a covenant of works or as a rule of obedience, the law is not of faith (Gal 3:12). That being the case, in God’s reckoning, the blessings for obedience were due only to the law-keeper, while the curses for disobedience were due to all law-breakers. What is more, only a law-keeping seed of Abraham would qualify, by his own righteousness, to be both God’s true heir and the surety—in truth, the Divine Surety incarnate—who would secure benefits not just for himself but for all others who would be heirs of God (cf. Gen 22:18; 49:10; Gal 3:8, 16). Until that unique law-keeper arrived, the Sinai covenant taught that the only hope of blessings for law-breakers was to embrace its witness to the Divine Surety and the perfection of His righteousness (i.e., obedience; cf. WLC 95). Accordingly, because unbelievers at Sinai would seek to secure the law’s blessings by their own righteousness, having in so doing detached the law from the Abrahamic covenant of grace and severed themselves from God’s suretyship (cf. Gal 5:4), He administered it to them according to the works principle. Reckoning their response as the ground of their recompense in this life and in the life to come, He condemned them under the law as a covenant of works (cf. WCF 19.6), leaving them in their state of sin, without excuse, and under its curse (cf. WLC 96). On the other hand, because believers received the Sinai covenant as the law of the Abrahamic covenant of grace and thus as the rule of their obedience by which they would show their faith, God administered it to them according to the grace principle. Having justified them by faith, He declared them to be not under the law as a covenant of works, though still subject to the law as the rule of their obedience (WLC 97; cf. WCF 19.2, 6). Accordingly, while assuring them of the irrevocable benefits of His suretyship in the life to come (cf. WLC 57-58; 65; 153), He reckoned their response to His law as the indispensable fruit of saving grace and applied to them the revocable rewards and chastisements for their character and conduct in this life (cf. WCF 14.2; 16.4, 6; WLC 28). Meanwhile, the Sinai covenant would testify to and wait for that unique law-keeping Seed of Abraham who would be both God’s true Heir and the Surety for all others who would be heirs through faith in Him.

Application of a dual administrative construct for the Sinai covenant may also be appealing because when we apply a dual administrative construct to the Sinai covenant, it seems quite adequate at addressing the legitimate core concerns that drive Kline’s approach (thanks to C. Lee Irons for his work to highlight these concerns). It upholds the presence of the works principle in the administration of the Sinai covenant (and by extension in the pre-fall covenant with Adam and the pre-creational covenant between the Father and the Son, though I do not discuss the latter two covenants directly in this series). It also preserves the usefulness of the works principle in the Sinai covenant’s administration to enable us to see more clearly the merit of Christ as our Divine Surety incarnate and the justice that is the foundation of God’s grace in Christ. Furthermore, it sustains the use of the works principle in God’s administration of the Sinai covenant to expose our inability to keep God’s law, to convict us of our guilt for breaking it, to awaken us to flee God’s wrath, to enable us to see our need of Him as our surety, and to drive us to Him in repentance and faith.

In light of our deep dive into Kline’s thinking, I would urge that his insights on God’s administration of the circumcision covenant are remarkably relevant for the interpretation of His administration of the Sinai covenant, and that those insights ought to be applied to that subject for our better understanding of God’s dealings with us sinners.