Green Baggins

posted by R. Fowler White

With the considerations of our two previous posts (here and here) in mind, let’s now take up Kline’s assessment of the relevance of God’s administration of the circumcision covenant for his understanding of God’s administration of the Sinai covenant.

To our surprise, we find no indication that Kline addressed this topic, and this omission leaves a hole in his interpretation of the Sinai covenant similar to those that Murray left in his interpretation of Lev 18:5. In saying this, I recall the question by which Kline identifies a covenant’s governing principle: what is the function of the human party’s response of obedience in a given covenant, whether of works or of grace (KP, 318)? Hearing that question, we are prepared to follow it as far as it will take us. Before long, however, another question challenges us: who was “the human partner” at Sinai? No doubt, with Kline, we would answer that the human party at Sinai was without exception that of “the law-breaker kind.” We must say more, however, lest we ignore a key point that needs attention. That is, we all realize that among those law-breakers at Sinai was a remnant justified by faith as Abraham was and also others condemned in their sin. All those law-breakers at Sinai, then, were not of one kind. Nor was their response of one kind: the remnant’s response was consistent with the principle and surety of divine grace; the others’ response was consistent with the principle of works. These realities remind us of the scenario that Kline convincingly discerned in God’s administration of the circumcision covenant. They also prompt us to examine further how that administration might help us understand God’s administration of the Sinai covenant.

Reflecting on Kline’s omission, I would suggest that God administered the Sinai covenant just as He administered the circumcision covenant—which is to say that He administered it differently to the remnant than He did to the rest. As for the remnant, He dealt with them as He did with Abraham: according to grace. He did so because, consistent with the principle and surety of divine grace, the remnant responded to the Sinai covenant as law attached to the Abrahamic covenant of grace and thus as stipulations by which they were to show their faith in God as their surety. As for the rest, God dealt with them according to works because, consistent with the principle of works, they responded to the Sinai covenant as law detached from the Abrahamic covenant of grace and so as stipulations by which they were to secure benefits from God. From these observations, I would argue that we see the material relevance of Kline’s insights on God’s administration of the circumcision covenant for our understanding of His administration of the Sinai covenant. In fact, we recognize that, because there were two possible responses to the obligations of the Sinai covenant, there were also two contrasting but compatible principles at work in its administration. There was a principle consistent with the proper purpose of the Sinai covenant, and it was that of grace for those who had faith. Even so, since the Sinai covenant could not be reduced to its proper purpose, there was another principle for those who lacked faith, and it was that of works.

Conclusion. To the best of my knowledge, despite his insights on the dual administration of the circumcision covenant, Kline does not explore the applicability of that construct to his analysis of the administration of the Sinai covenant. This alternative approach may prove helpful, however, to those who subscribe to the Westminster Standards as Kline did. The construct offers a clear and simple explanation of the Standards’ twofold description of the law as a covenant of works and a rule of obedience (cf. WCF 19.2, 6; WLC 97). A dual administrative construct affirms that the administration of the Sinai covenant proceeded from the premise that, whether administered as a covenant of works or as a rule of obedience, the law is not of faith (Gal 3:12). That being the case, in God’s reckoning, the blessings for obedience were due only to the law-keeper, while the curses for disobedience were due to all law-breakers. What is more, only a law-keeping seed of Abraham would qualify, by his own righteousness, to be both God’s true heir and the surety—in truth, the Divine Surety incarnate—who would secure benefits not just for himself but for all others who would be heirs of God (cf. Gen 22:18; 49:10; Gal 3:8, 16). Until that unique law-keeper arrived, the Sinai covenant taught that the only hope of blessings for law-breakers was to embrace its witness to the Divine Surety and the perfection of His righteousness (i.e., obedience; cf. WLC 95). Accordingly, because unbelievers at Sinai would seek to secure the law’s blessings by their own righteousness, having in so doing detached the law from the Abrahamic covenant of grace and severed themselves from God’s suretyship (cf. Gal 5:4), He administered it to them according to the works principle. Reckoning their response as the ground of their recompense in this life and in the life to come, He condemned them under the law as a covenant of works (cf. WCF 19.6), leaving them in their state of sin, without excuse, and under its curse (cf. WLC 96). On the other hand, because believers received the Sinai covenant as the law of the Abrahamic covenant of grace and thus as the rule of their obedience by which they would show their faith, God administered it to them according to the grace principle. Having justified them by faith, He declared them to be not under the law as a covenant of works, though still subject to the law as the rule of their obedience (WLC 97; cf. WCF 19.2, 6). Accordingly, while assuring them of the irrevocable benefits of His suretyship in the life to come (cf. WLC 57-58; 65; 153), He reckoned their response to His law as the indispensable fruit of saving grace and applied to them the revocable rewards and chastisements for their character and conduct in this life (cf. WCF 14.2; 16.4, 6; WLC 28). Meanwhile, the Sinai covenant would testify to and wait for that unique law-keeping Seed of Abraham who would be both God’s true Heir and the Surety for all others who would be heirs through faith in Him.

Application of a dual administrative construct for the Sinai covenant may also be appealing because when we apply a dual administrative construct to the Sinai covenant, it seems quite adequate at addressing the legitimate core concerns that drive Kline’s approach (thanks to C. Lee Irons for his work to highlight these concerns). It upholds the presence of the works principle in the administration of the Sinai covenant (and by extension in the pre-fall covenant with Adam and the pre-creational covenant between the Father and the Son, though I do not discuss the latter two covenants directly in this series). It also preserves the usefulness of the works principle in the Sinai covenant’s administration to enable us to see more clearly the merit of Christ as our Divine Surety incarnate and the justice that is the foundation of God’s grace in Christ. Furthermore, it sustains the use of the works principle in God’s administration of the Sinai covenant to expose our inability to keep God’s law, to convict us of our guilt for breaking it, to awaken us to flee God’s wrath, to enable us to see our need of Him as our surety, and to drive us to Him in repentance and faith.

In light of our deep dive into Kline’s thinking, I would urge that his insights on God’s administration of the circumcision covenant are remarkably relevant for the interpretation of His administration of the Sinai covenant, and that those insights ought to be applied to that subject for our better understanding of God’s dealings with us sinners.

posted by R. Fowler White

Having reviewed Kline’s analysis of God’s administration of the circumcision covenant, we move on to consider the connections between Abraham, circumcision, and Sinai.

The circumcision covenant and the Sinai covenant. Since circumcision was but one stipulation in what Kline calls “the law of the [Abrahamic] covenant of promise” (Gen 17:1b; 18:19, KP, 310), it is fitting to notice that Abraham’s compliance with the circumcision command (Gen 17:22-27) was one of the many acts of obedience in his life of faith (see Kline’s survey in KP, 309-18). To this effect, the author of Hebrews recounts how it was by faith that the patriarch obeyed, from his submission to God’s initial command in Ur (Gen 12:1; Heb 11:8) through his submission to God’s climactic command at Mt Moriah (Gen 22:1-2; Heb 11:17-19). Moses also relates how Abraham’s obedience was such that God reckoned it as compliance with His charge, commandments, statutes, and laws (Gen 26:5). Remarkably, those legal terms are a virtual match for those that summarize God’s requirements for Israel (Deut 11:1). The parallels prompt Kline to observe: “That the characteristic phraseology used for the covenant stipulations in the Mosaic law could be thus applied to the life of Abraham shows that obligations were as natural and integral an element of the Abrahamic Covenant as they were in the Sinaitic and Deuteronomic covenants” (KP, 311). The continuity between God’s stipulations for Abraham and for Israel provides us good reason to understand 1) that the standard applied to Israel at Sinai was an organic extension and elaboration of the standard applied to Abraham himself and 2) that Abraham’s obedience was a model for Israel (Gen 18:19).

The Abrahamic covenant and the Sinai covenant. In light of the preceding discussion, a critical question arises: how was the Sinai covenant related to the Abrahamic covenant? To get Kline’s answer to this question, we refer back to his synopsis of the two kinds of conditionality and ask, did God administer the Sinai covenant as the stipulations integral to the Abrahamic covenant of grace, or did He administer it as a separate covenant of works alongside (or, as Kline prefers to say, ‘overlying’) the Abrahamic covenant of grace? Anyone familiar with Kline’s publications knows that he vigorously defends the thesis that God administered the Sinai covenant (with its types and shadows) as a separate (typological) covenant of works alongside the Abrahamic covenant of grace. Basing his argument on the contrasts presented in texts like Rom 10:4ff. and Gal 3:10ff. and especially on Paul’s use of Lev 18:5, Kline distills his reasoning this way: “It was only because Paul thus recognized the presence of this works principle in the law that he could identify the old covenant as an administration of bondage, condemnation, and death in contrast to the new covenant, which he characterized as one of freedom, righteousness, and life (Gal 4:24-26; 2 Cor 3:6-9)” (KP, 320). In other words, according to Kline, the controlling principle by which God administered the Sinai covenant must have been works, not grace, because it was Israel’s works, not the principle and surety of grace, that secured for them the blessings of life in Canaan.

Kline’s thesis on the administration of the Sinai covenant has provoked reactions on a spectrum ranging from fervently positive to fervently negative. Speaking for myself, I find much in Kline to be positive about, but I react with surprise that he identifies parallels between the circumcision covenant and the Sinai covenant and yet makes very limited use of those parallels to illuminate God’s administration of the Sinai covenant. I refer primarily to his fairly lengthy discussion of “Sovereign Grace and Human Obligation” (KP, 309-26). There Kline carefully highlights three points pertinent to the relationship of circumcision and Sinai: 1) circumcision as a stipulation of the law of the Abrahamic covenant of grace, 2) the stipulations of the Sinai covenant as an organic extension and elaboration of the stipulations imposed on Abraham, and 3) Abraham’s obedience as a model for Israel. In the process of these considerations, Kline takes great care to demonstrate that the conditionality attached to circumcision was, in keeping with its proper purpose, that of a (i.e., the Abrahamic) covenant of grace. In addition, he offers a compelling case that God’s administration of the circumcision covenant was not reduced to its proper purpose but was consistent with its twofold potential, a potential that, as indicated in part 1 of this series, follows precisely the two principles of grace and works.

Given the noticeable continuity between the circumcision covenant and the Sinai covenant as two editions of the law of the Abrahamic covenant of grace, we have warrant to explore the relevance of Kline’s insights for our understanding of God’s administration of the Sinai covenant. For example, might we be able to argue that, because the circumcision covenant and the Sinai covenant were both integrally related as, respectively, the Abrahamic and the Sinaitic-Deuteronomic elements of the law of the Abrahamic covenant (KP, 311), God administered both covenants according to the same principles? Might we see two administrative scenarios coming into view? That is, might we say that God dealt in grace with the remnant in Israel who in faith received the Sinai covenant, in keeping with its proper purpose, as law attached to the Abrahamic covenant by which they would show their faith in God as their surety? Might we also say that God dealt in justice with the rest of Israel who in unbelief received the Sinai covenant as law detached from the Abrahamic covenant by which they would seek to secure its benefits from God?

In the third and final post of this series, we will see if and how Kline assesses the relevance of God’s administration of the circumcision covenant for his understanding of God’s administration of the Sinai covenant.

posted by R. Fowler White

What relevance, if any, does God’s administration of the circumcision covenant have for our understanding of the Sinai covenant? My answer: a great deal of relevance. To lay out how I arrived at this answer, I propose in this three-part study to walk through Meredith G. Kline’s discussions of these two covenants and their relationship to the Abrahamic covenant, focusing especially on how the principles of works and grace were compatibly applied in God’s administration of them.

A starting point. Summarizing the compatibility of divine grace and human obligation in biblical-theological perspective, Kline writes the following regarding God’s covenantal dealings with Abraham:

The promised kingdom blessings would unfailingly be realized to the full extent of the divine commitment. That was guaranteed by the sovereignty of the divine power working according to God’s sovereign purpose of grace. At the same time a conditionality of human responsibility necessarily entered into the stipulated terms of the covenant of promise. …

… It was only as Abraham responded in obedience to the command of God’s call that he could enter into the hope offered in the promises. This is not to say that the promised heavenly inheritance was to be secured by the works principle, that is, on the ground of obedience. It does mean that the divine promises of the covenant never existed apart from human obligations. (Kline, Kingdom Prologue [hereafter KP], 309)

Taking the preceding comments as a starting point for what follows, we turn next to Kline’s assessment of the relationship between “the covenant of circumcision” (Gen 17:10, 13; Acts 7:8) and the Abrahamic covenant.

The circumcision covenant and the Abrahamic covenant. Regarding circumcision, Kline argues that, though God designates it as a covenant (Heb. berith),

This [identification] should not mislead us into regarding circumcision as a separate covenant in itself alongside the Abrahamic Covenant. For the full-orbed designation of circumcision found in v. 11 is actually ’oth berith, ‘sign of the covenant.’ Clearly then circumcision is to be subsumed as a subordinate part under the previously established Abrahamic Covenant, in the course of whose administration it was promulgated. (KP, 313)

Circumcision was, therefore, not a covenant separate from the Abrahamic covenant of promise. Rather, it was one stipulation in the “general, comprehensive formulation of the law of the covenant of promise” in Gen 17:1b, Walk before Me and be blameless (KP, 310). With that in mind, Kline goes on to clarify how stipulations like circumcision functioned in the Abrahamic covenant:

A certain kind of conditionality attached to the covenant of promise, one consistent with the principle and surety of divine grace. There could not but be demands placed on God’s human partner in kingdom-covenant, creational or redemptive. … Such divine demand for godliness is therefore found in covenants of works and grace alike. The precise kind of conditionality carried by the imposed obligations differs, however, in these two types of covenant. (KP, 318)

To distinguish the two varieties of conditionality, Kline poses “the key question”: what is the function of the human party’s response of obedience in a given covenant, whether of works or of grace (KP, 318)? If the obedience is intended to show (i.e., authenticate) one’s faith in God as one’s surety, the conditionality is that of a covenant of grace. If the obedience is meant to secure benefits from God for oneself and others, the conditionality is that of a covenant of works (cf. Kline, God, Heaven and Har Magedon [hereafter GHHM], 102-03). So, what kind of conditionality was attached to the obligation of circumcision? Kline answers that obedience to the circumcision command showed one’s faith in God as one’s surety, such that the conditionality was that of a covenant of grace, specifically, the Abrahamic covenant of grace.

There is, however, more to unpack here. Kline argues that recognizing circumcision as a confirmatory sign of a covenant of grace involves also recognizing it as a confirmatory sign of judgment. He explains:

[Circumcision] conveyed the threat of being cut off from God and life for the one who, disclaiming the grace of the covenant and thus breaking it, would undergo in himself the judgment due to Adam’s fallen race. But circumcision also presented the promise of the Cross, inviting the circumcised to identify by faith with Christ, to undergo the judgment of God in him, and so find in his circumcision-judgment the way to the Father, to justification and life. (KP, 315-16)

It was, therefore, the proper purpose of circumcision to signify the promise of undergoing excision through faith in God as one’s surety, and it was that proper purpose that Paul cites in Rom 4:11. Kline goes on to observe, however, that God’s administration of the circumcision covenant could not be reduced to its proper purpose. In Rom 2:25-29 Paul insists that if the circumcised refused to die to sin and to live before God, their circumcision became uncircumcision. Exposed as transgressors, the circumcised faced a choice: either undergo excision through faith in God (i.e., “circumcise your heart,” Deut 10:16), or else undergo excision in their own persons (i.e., be cut off, removed; Jer 4:4; 9:25). In this way, Kline maintains that circumcision signified divine condemnation in its twofold potential: its proper purpose was to signify the promise of vicarious condemnation-excision in God as one’s surety, and it also signified the threat of one’s own condemnation-excision. Here we note that, as Kline sees it, God administered the circumcision covenant according to two contrasting but compatible principles. When it came to the circumcised who had faith and embraced the promise signified in circumcision (as Abraham did), God treated them, in keeping with its proper purpose, according to the principle of His grace. When it came, however, to the circumcised who lacked faith and rejected the promise signified in circumcision, God treated them according to the principle of works, that is, in keeping with His justice.

In part 2 of this three-part series, we study the connections between circumcision and Sinai.