Carl Trueman’s Seminar

Original Sin in Modern Theology

He plans on dealing with four theologians (Friedrich Schleiermacher, Walter Rauschenbusch, Karl Barth, Rudolf Bultmann). Modern theology, in losing scriptural authority, has lost its unifying factor. He seeks to look at the implications of their project. His basic conclusion is that, in modern theology, sin is horizontal, and not vertical. That is, it brings about enmity between people, and has no implications with a relationship to God.

Friedrich Schleiermacher: original sin became distasteful, and therefore ignored. He wanted to rebuild Christian dogmatics. The God-consciousness (the feeling of utter dependence). Psychology is central to his understanding of sin. The human is two-fold: the higher consciousness and sense consciousness. Obstruction of the sense of the higher consciousness is Schleiermacher’s definition of sin. Sin is psychological. For Schleiermacher, Jesus is the primary example of someone living in utter dependence. He doesn’t care whether Adam and Eve were historical. He regards the traditional teaching on Adam and Eve is incoherent. He believes that creation is inherently flawed. The Fall is therefore a paradigm of how the sensuous consciousness obstructs the God-consciousness. Sin is a disruption of human psychology.

Walter Rauschenbusch: (the originator of the social gospel). Rauschenbusch sought to recast Christianity in such a way as to address social problems. The kingdom of God is central to his theology: but not as individual, but a more corporate focus (can anyone say New Perspective on Paul? LK). Sin of the structures is a Rauschenbusch construct. He implicitly denies the historicity of Adam. His view of Christianity is purely pragmatic. All ideas are judged by their practical merit. He views the traditional view of the Fall as downplaying later societal evils. He does, however, believe in human solidarity. For him, sin is selfishness (dependent on Schleiermacher). If sin is primarily horizontal, then there is no basis for opposing gay marriage. So, this is not just an ethereal irrelevancy.

Karl Barth: he was definitely a rebel against Schleiermacher and Rauschenbusch. However, his thinking on original sin owes quite a bit to liberalism. He often uses the language of orthodoxy, but opposes the ideas behind the traditional doctrine. Barth distinguishes between historie and geschichte (history and significance). Adam and Eve are saga, a third term that is close to myth. He posits a contradiction between Genesis 1 and 2. Plus, he rejects the unfallen nature of the creation before the Fall. For Barth, Adam is Everyman. Adam is the truth concerning us. Adam as the paradigm for us is something Barth has in common with Schleiermacher. Barth reverses the first and second Adams. This pushes Barth in a universalistic direction, though he is not explicit. We are not IN Adam, but we actually ARE Adam.

Rudolf Bultmann: arguably the most influential New Testament scholar of the twentieth century. He actually believed that the idea of a pristine creation is due to a gnostic intrusion into the New Testament. Bultmann says that Paul’s account of sin is incoherent. Bultmann believed that the Fall is a myth.

Conclusion: All are in the stream of Enlightenment theology. All reject the relevance of the historicity of Adam. They don’t necessarily say that Adam wasn’t historical. They are saying it doesn’t really matter whether Adam was or not. There is therefore no movement from pristine innocence to guilt, which in turn brings into question the transition from guilt to grace. The nature of sin as attenuated. The “problem” of the injustice of the imputation of Adam’s guilt is not solved in modern theology. If we can’t be held accountable for Adam’s sin, then why should we be help accountable for our own sin?

An Important Point

You can read for yourself Illiana Presbytery’s motion to have the SJC reconsider the Leithart case. I had a chance to read it before the Presbytery voted on it, and I thought it was very well done. It brings up a very important point, even an obvious one, which I had neglected to mention so far in the blog posts about the Leithart case, and that is simply this: the SJC decision did not actually address the substance of the complaint. The complaint was about the Presbytery exonerating someone who was not teaching biblically and confessionally. The SJC decision has for its one and only question whether the complainant proved the case. Whether the complainant proved the case is neither here nor there when it comes to the actual basis of a decision on the complaint, which must rest entirely on the record of the case. Therefore, what the SJC needed to do is to read the ROC with the sole purpose of determining whether PNWP did the right thing in exonerating Leithart. In other words, the SJC made the oral and written arguments of the prosecutor the basis of their decision, instead of the ROC.

Is the FV Controversy Dead?

Doug Wilson has weighed in on the controversy here. He makes two basic points, one to the critics of the FV, and one to the FV’ers. His point to the critics is that they should dial down the rhetoric against the FV because a court of the church has spoken. His point to the FV’ers is that they should become more careful with their terms in order to avoid confusion. Alas for Doug, neither point will be followed. This critic will certainly not dial down the rhetoric (although I try to avoid rhetoric, actually, preferring straight logic). And the FV’ers can’t help their use of terms, much. They delight in ambiguity and multivalency.

On the first point, even though a church court has spoken, that doesn’t mean that I have to agree with it, nor does it mean that church court decisions are above criticism. Or will we start saying that Machen should just have stayed quiet and been a good boy? Not to mention Luther. There have been many already who have wished to use this decision of the SJC as a way of shutting up people like myself. This is ironic, when many of the people who voted for the decision in the SJC still think of the FV as being outside the boundaries of the confession.

This brings us to another important point to consider: the SJC would almost certainly not agree with Doug’s take on the decision (as vindicating Leithart’s theology so that it is within the boundaries). The SJC decision regards itself as ruling on a primarily procedural matter (that the complainant did not prove the case). The “damage control” clauses and paragraphs are certainly intended to go in this direction.

However, in another twist, I agree with Doug on the practical impact of the decision: that it pronounces Leithart’s theology as being within the boundaries. And the reason I say that is simple: why in the world would the SJC encourage PNWP and Leithart to work on clarity of expression and avoiding ambiguity, if the SJC were not pronouncing on the confessionality of Leithart’s theology? That paragraph in the decision gives the decided impression that the only real problem is ambiguity and misuse of terms, in other words, semantics. To put the matter in an even more pointed fashion, how can the SJC say that it is not pronouncing on Leithart’s theology, when that paragraph pronounces on Leithart’s theology? De jure, the SJC may be able to distance itself from Leithart’s theology. De facto, they have pronounced that Leithart is confessional, and yet careless with terms, and that he merely needs to clean up that little (!) problem.

The Polity of the PCA


This is now an edited version reflecting some recent conversations I have had, and, I believe, has a more accurate picture of the situation.

I am continuing to talk to people about the Leithart case (sometimes it seems like that is the only thing I am doing!). I am gaining a somewhat clearer picture of the situation, and if this post is seen as something of a mild corrective to the previous post, so be it. I still believe that the SJC decision is the wrong one, and I am still convinced that there was a way to reverse the PNWP decision.

What I want to address here is the polity of the PCA. When he of blessed memory, Jack Williamson, helped to write the BCO, fresh in his mind and in the minds of those with him were the ecclesiastical abuses of the PCUSA. So, Williamson and Co. set out to write a BCO that would prevent ecclesiastical abuse. This worked fairly well as long as the denomination was unified around the truth. However, what it wound up doing was creating some ambiguities, which, over time, have been interpreted by the SJC in certain directions. Certain terms are being interpreted extremely narrowly, like “constitutional.” The SJC now seems to be interpreting this term to mean “procedural,” as if doctrinal matters are not covered under the consideration of the constitution.

Furthermore, what we have in our denomination is centralized power located in the wrong place. It is located in the committees and agencies, rather than in the highest court. As a result of this, the presbyteries are pretty much autonomous. There is now really no way of disciplining rogue presbyteries as long as they follow the “procedure.” This is not Presbyterian polity. This is a hybrid of congregationalism and presbyterianism. It is presbyterian with regard to sessions and presbyteries, but congregationalist with regard to the relationship between presbyteries and general assembly. Only we like to call it “grass roots” Presbyterianism. At this point, looking back on it with hindsight, that is a bit like saying “congregationalist presbyterian.”

Is there any way of fixing this? I tend to doubt it. Attempts have been made, and have failed. Our fathers did not foresee the problems that would arise from this form of government. It seems that grass-roots Presbyterianism is a failure at polity. The ambiguity of our polity is to blame (at least partially) for this disaster. As I said before, I still think there was a way to correct the PNWP, even with our ambiguous polity. However, our ambiguous polity sure didn’t help. There are still sections, some of which have been brought up in the comments, that clearly allow the SJC to reverse the lower court’s decision.

The Decision in the Leithart Case

Here is a copy of the decision in Word format for easier reading (the pdf’s are always a bit dim). This decision was written by friends of mine. I know who they are and I respect them, even though I deeply disagree with their decision. In short, I believe they selectively used the Book of Church Order, and failed to condemn erroneous opinion. What follows below is the decision in blockquote, and my commentary interspersed. You can read the summary of the facts yourselves, and I have no comments on them. I will start with the statement of the issue, Roman Numeral II.

II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Did the Complainant demonstrate, based on the record in this Case, that the Pacific Northwest Presbytery violated the Constitution of the PCA when it concluded that the accused was not guilty of holding and teaching views that are in conflict with the system of doctrine taught in the Westminster Standards?

III. JUDGMENT(S)

No.

It is important to realize that the basis for the decision must be the record of the case, not how well the prosecutor did in his job. So, the real question here is this: did the record of the case demonstrate that PNW Presbytery violated the constitution when it concluded that the accused was not guilty?

In the reasoning and opinion, the decision cites RAO 17-1, BCO 42-5, BCO 39-3.1 and BCO 39-2.4. I will not quote them in full, as they are in the document. I want to point out a couple of things in those very quotations that I think were ignored by the SJC. Firstly, the SJC needs to apply the Constitution of the church in resolving the matter (BCO 39-3.1). No doubt the SJC thinks that it did so. However, as we will see, it did so selectively. Secondly, there are provisions for a higher court reversing the lower court’s factual findings, and “matters of discretion and judgment:” there needs to be a clear error on the part of the lower court. Notice especially that this language is NOT limited to procedural matters only, but also to “matters of discretion and judgment.” Thirdly, the great deference normally shown to a lower court does not equally apply in matters concerning the interpretation of the Constitution of the Church. Does the Leithart case involve matters relating to the interpretation of the Constitution of the Church? It certainly does. The relationship of Leithart’s views with the Westminster Standards is most certainly a matter involving the interpretation, not only of Leithart’s views, but also of the Standards. So, in this case, the great deference normally shown to a lower court does not apply. There is clear error on the part of PNW Presbytery, and the case involves the interpretation of the Constitution, both very good reasons why the court should not defer to PNW Presbytery.

What follows is the first of several attempts to distance the SJC theologically from Leithart’s views. On the one hand, I believe these statements to be true expressions of the writers. On the other hand, since there is now no way of forcing Leithart to leave the denomination, this caveat is a bit moot. The horse is already out of the barn. It says, “In short, our review in this Case is constitutionally limited to the information developed in the Record dealing with this specific Case. Thus, nothing in our Decision or reasoning should be understood as rendering any judgment on any ‘school of thought’ within or without the PCA.” It is difficult, however, for this principle to be carried out, since the record of the case itself is chock full of information on one particular member of the school of thought known as the Federal Vision. Any ruling on the ROC is going to include an implicit ruling on the school of thought laid out in the ROC. Ruling on the ROC cannot be so easily separated from ruling on a school of thought.

What follows is the statement of the question as the decision sees it:

Our review could focus only on: (a) whether the Complainant demonstrated that the Presbytery committed procedural errors in its handling of this matter; (b) whether the Complainant demonstrated that Presbytery misunderstood TE Leithart’s views; and (c) whether the Complainant demonstrated that TE Leithart’s views are in conflict with the system of doctrine.

One procedural error that is not mentioned in this decision, but which should have been addressed is the failure of PNW Presbytery to condemn erroneous opinion (BCO 13-9f). This is a procedural matter. Even though the wording is that it has power to condemn, in context all the actions noted are actions that Presbytery is responsible for doing. So it is not just that it has the authority to do so, but also that it has the responsibility to do so, especially when it involves views that endanger the peace and purity of the denomination, and there are few opinions more dangerous to the peace and purity of the denomination than the Federal Vision. I have never seen anything so divisive. Secondly, there is a problem with letter b. We said above that the conditions of this case were such that great deference to the lower court is not required, and in fact should not be followed. Why is the SJC then claiming that the complainant has to demonstrate Presbytery’s misunderstanding of Leithart’s views? The basis for making a decision on whether PNW Presbytery erred is surely Leithart’s own writings, not what anyone’s opinion about them is. With letter c also, it is phrased in such a way as to suggest that the complainant has to do the proving. The ROC is what proves that Leithart’s views are out of accord with the Standards. On this particular issue, it wouldn’t matter whether the prosecutor proved anything. Even if (only to take the devil’s advocate position for a minute) the prosecutor did a complete slam dunk, the SJC still could only rule based on the ROC, not what the prosecutor derived or failed to derive from it.

It is my understanding that the Prosecutor did raise the procedural concern of failing to condemn erroneous opinions (BCO 13-9f). Therefore the following statement not only has an error of fact, but also one of judgment: “The Complainant raised no procedural concerns. Further, it is our conclusion that Presbytery carefully complied with all the procedural steps required by the Rules of Discipline.” All except condemning erroneous opinion.

The decision goes on to quote the Presbytery’s words in finding problems with Leithart’s teaching. I am a bit puzzled by this section of the decision. Why is PNW Presbytery’s recognition of problems in Leithart’s theology sufficient to get PNW Presbytery off the hook with regard to what they should or shouldn’t have done with Leithart? PNW Presbytery failed to condemn erroneous opinion. They noted problems, and then failed to do anything about it except mention it. This is not a condemnation of erroneous opinion. Whatever it is, it is not that.

One of the most important paragraphs is on the last page. I will quote it in full:

Presbytery’s Commission, however, concluded unanimously that the Prosecution did not prove TE Leithart’s guilt with regard to the five charges against him (hence the finding of “not guilty” on each of the five specifications) and, with regard to all the examples noted above (and other issues), TE Leithart’s differences with the Standards amounted to semantic differences. They noted that in his testimony that TE Leithart qualified many of his more provocative statements in ways that the Presbytery’s Commission concluded brought them into conformity with the Standards. In addition, the Presbytery’s Commission pointed out that TE Leithart expressly affirmed his subscription to specific statements in the Westminster Standards that were included in the indictment or raised during the trial. Presbytery overwhelmingly adopted the verdicts recommended by its Commission. We do not find that the Complainant provided sufficient evidence that TE Leithart’s statements affirming his subscription to the Standards were incredible or that Presbytery’s decision in finding TE Leithart “not guilty” of the five charges was in error.

There are several problems with this paragraph. First of all, as we have been noting before, there is much too much deference being paid here to the Presbytery’s opinion of what Leithart taught rather than to what Leithart actually said. The logic here seems to be that if the entire Presbytery says it, it must be true. Truth is not discovered by counting noses. The issue of whether Leithart qualified his statements in the trial is not to the point. He did not repent of any of his statements that were the most problematic. Affirmation of the standards is also irrelevant, since FV proponents understand something completely different by what the Standards say than what they actually say. All FV proponents have professed allegiance to the Standards at some point or other, with the possible exception of James Jordan. In the last sentence, we find the SJC basing part of their rationale on Leithart’s own evaluation of his innocence or guilt. Is a person on trial ever going to admit to guilt? There is more than sufficient evidence in the ROC to prove that Leithart’s statements affirming his subscription to the Standards are incredible. Again, the prosecutor doesn’t have to provide that if it is already in the ROC.

But the most problematic of all, and the paragraph that gives Leithart a pass theologically, is the second to last paragraph:

In light of our conclusions, we urge that Pacific Northwest Presbytery continue to encourage TE Leithart to take care that when he uses standard theological terms (such as baptism, justification, sanctification, efficacious, and arrabon) in non-standard ways that he make clear those differences in use and that he continue to clarify how his views in key areas are not in conflict with the Standards.

Implicit in this paragraph is the statement that Leithart’s views are not in conflict with the Standards. All Leithart needs to do, and all the Presbytery needs to do, is to continue to clarify how that is the case. That is all that is needed. There doesn’t need to be any repentance on Leithart for leading people astray by his aberrant views. There is no need for the Presbytery to repent of exonerating him. All that is needed is continued encouragement for the PNW Presbytery, aided by Leithart himself, to clarify and qualify his statements.

Lastly, we have the final paragraph, which is certainly intended as a damage control paragraph:

Finally, we reiterate that nothing in this Decision should be construed as addressing (or thereby endorsing) in general TE Leithart’s views, writings, teachings or pronouncements. The Decision is based on the specific issues raised in the indictment and the Record of the Case as developed at the trial. Our conclusion is simply that neither the prosecution nor the Complainant proved that TE Leithart’s views, as articulated at the trial or otherwise contained in the Record of the Case, violate the system of doctrine contained in the Westminster Standards.

Here’s the problem: the indictment and the ROC involve heavily Leithart’s views. How, then, can a decision based on the ROC be NOT addressing Leithart’s views? The ROC is nothing but a discussion of Leithart’s views! The specific issues raised in the indictment and the ROC are Leithart’s views. The bar is set too high here, as well. The complainant and the prosecution, in one sense, do not need to prove that Leithart’s views are out of accord, if the ROC clearly shows that. I am a biased witness, of course, in this matter, as I also said at the trial. But I do believe that my testimony alone is sufficient to prove the case. There were no holes in my research. Their conclusion is that there are no proofs anywhere that Leithart teaches anything contrary to the Standards, since my research, included in the ROC, brought together ALL the problematic quotations of Leithart. That constitutes no proof, according to this judgment.

And, by the way, just for the record, I only started reading Leithart’s works in earnest AFTER I was asked to be a witness in the case. Before I was asked to be a witness, I had read exactly 1 book and 2 articles of Leithart. Hardly a vendetta or an obsession with Leithart, contrary to some things that were said during the trial. No doubt, if I had not read more than Leithart himself recommended to me (which was only The Baptized Body and Priesthood of the Plebs), the defense would have countered by saying that I had not read widely enough in Leithart’s writings to justify being an expert witness. ___if you do, and ___if you don’t.

No doubt, many will say to me, “Who are you to judge the SJC, you little pipsqueak?” I cannot change the SJC’s decision. Nevertheless, courts of the church may err, and in this case, they certainly did. That is my opinion. To my readers, that is worth whatever they assign to my opinion. I am voicing my opinion. That’s all it is. I would heartily encourage the members of the SJC to repent of their decision. It is the wrong decision completely. In time, I pray, they will come to realize just how wrong this decision is. I invite any one of them to talk to me about this. I have already talked to some. And I still respect many of them. It is fortunate indeed that one wrong decision on a court case like this does not condemn us to Hell. The blood of Christ is much, much more powerful than that.

The Leithart Verdict

Normally, the Standing Judicial Commission sends a panel to hear a case (usually 3, but sometimes 5 or even 7). In the case of the Leithart trial complaint, the case was heard by the full court. That means that the decision is usually the final verdict, unless a motion (which has to be in order) has been filed to reconsider the case. If that happens, then the verdict will be treated as if it were a panel’s decision. That is what has happened in the Leithart case. The verdict is in, and the verdict is to reject the complaint that Pacific Northwest Presbytery erred in exonerating Leithart. That may be a bit hard to follow. PNW Presbytery exonerated Leithart in the trial. That decision was complained against. The complaint always goes first to the Presbytery, which in this case rejected the complaint. That complaint was then taken to the SJC. The SJC has now concurred with the PNW Presbytery. This is the final decision, since there has been no request for a reconsideration.

To say that I am disappointed in the decision would be a gross understatement. Aghast is more appropriate here. We are not talking about narrow Reformed versus broad Reformed. We are talking about evangelicalism versus what amounts to Roman Catholic teaching. At this point, it will not matter if the SJC decides to try to distance itself from Leithart’s theology. They will have allowed his theology to exist. This decision is completely and utterly wrong. The record of the case should have been enough all by itself to convince anyone truly confessional that Leithart’s theology does not fall within its boundaries. It does not fall within evangelicalism, let alone Reformed theology.

Pope Francis I

The Roman Catholic Church has chosen its first non-European pope ever, and they went to the archbishop of Buenos Aires, Jorge Mario Bergoglio. In taking a name no other pope has ever chosen, it seems likely that this pope will have some new directions for the Roman Catholic Church in mind. Both of the famous Francisi of history were reformers. St. Francis of Assisi introduced social reform to the church, whereas Francis Xavier was the founder of the Jesuit movement. Possibly, then, a combination of social reform and theological reform is coming?

A Big Day for the PCA

Today the case of the complaint regarding the Peter Leithart trial comes before the Standing Judicial Commission. Regardless of which side my readers think ought to win (and I’m sure there are those on both sides), it is a huge case with large ramifications for the denomination. Both sides ought to pray that God’s truth would triumph, and that His glory be made manifest, that God’s will (not MY will!) be done, and that the gospel would be paramount. Everyone, please pray about this. In my opinion, this is a far more important day than entire weeks of General Assembly have been for the past several years.

A Guest Post by Leonardo de Chirico

I received an email from Leonardo de Chirico, which has a fascinating analysis of possible candidates for the next Pope. I reproduce that email here, with his permission. I have only very lightly edited it. I also make another disclaimer that Chirico says a few things here in a way different than I would. I found the piece very interesting, chiefly for his analysis of the candidates for the next Pope.

Papabili: A Short Guide Waiting for the Conclave

The outcome of a conclave can be unpredictable. Whether or not one believes that the Holy Spirit actually works in the election of the Roman pontiff, its results defy easy previsions. As an absolute monarchy, the Vatican does not normally operate according to democratic procedures. The conclave, however, is one of the few instances where each vote counts and the total amount of them (two thirds is the majority for the first 34 ballots) determines history. So there is room for political maneuvering and surprises.

The Role of Benedict XVI

Having resigned from office at over 80 years of age means that Benedict XVI will be cut off from the conclave. During the conclave he will be living at Castel Gandolfo, the papal summer residence on the hills outside of Rome. Though physically absent, his influence will be powerful in a couple of respects.

First, as a living former Pope his shadow will be a major factor in determining what the cardinals will decide. It is likely that no cardinal will vote someone that the present Pope would not himself vote. It is unlikely that the conclave will elect someone who would radically depart from Ratzinger’s trajectory, since he will still be around during and after the conclave. Following the new Pope’s election, Benedict XVI will go back to the Vatican where he will live in a former monastery inside the Vatican walls. He will be there and around. The co-habitation with the new Pope suggests that the latter will be somewhat a prolongation of the former. Without voting and without using words, Benedict XVI will have a say in the next election.

Second, his input in the conclave is evident in considering the fact that during his pontificate he has nominated about half of the 117 electors. The composition of the conclave is largely shaped by men personally chosen by Benedict XVI, men he trusted.

There are two counter-elements to be considered. One is that the conclave will not be held in the emotional atmosphere that generally follows the funerals of the previous Pope. It will be more cerebral than sentimental. The other is that, given the unprecedented decision by Benedict to resign and the shock that has caused in the curia, the conclave could be used as a showdown in the Vatican checkerboard. It is clear that Ratzinger’s weakening conditions that led to his resignations were hastened by internal fights and unresolved tensions in various Vatican departments. The conclave will have to decide what to do about them and the outcome could be surprising. Benedict surrendered to the stand-still situation, but the new Pope will have to act.

A List of Candidates

After two non-Italian Popes (the Polish Wojtyła and the German Ratzinger) is it time for an Italian one? If this is the case, then the Archbishop of Milan Angelo Scola (72) is the first and perhaps only option. The Italian candidates, however, could pay the price of a possible showdown. Many of the recent scandals (e.g. Vatileaks and the Vatican bank’s financially opaque maneuvers) originated in the Roman curia, which is mainly governed by Italian prelates. Moreover, the Secretary of State Tarcisio Bertone (78), himself an Italian, is part of the on-going controversy. So the poor performance of the Italian hierarchy may result in leaving Italians out of the game to wait for the next round.

Two solidly “Ratzingerian” candidates are the Archbishop of Québec Marc Ouellet (68) and the Archbishop of Vienna, Christoph Schoenborn (68). The French-speaking Canadian Ouellet is the Prefect of the Congregation of Bishops and knows the Vatican machinery very well. His role of selecting the new bishops allowed him to have the pulse of the world-wide Church, though he is not a “charismatic” figure in Weberian terms. Schoenborn is a brilliant theologian that denounced some of the silences over the sex abuses scandal. His bold exposition on this issue could find resonance in some traditional circles. Adding to that, the fact that a growing number of Austrian priests are taking critical stances on the celibacy issue may falter Schoenborn’s candidacy. Another papabile in the same group is the Archbishop of New York, Timothy Dolan (63). Historically, North-American candidates have been excluded for the simple fact that the Roman Catholic Church did not feel comfortable with the idea of having a Pope coming from a super-power of the world. This emotional and political obstacle should be overcome to give Dolan a chance.

Finally, there are three outsiders. Voices around the world repeatedly say that the time has come for a “black” Pope. Cardinal Peter Turkson (65), Ghanean, is President of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace and a rising star in Vatican circles. A non-Western Pope would definitely come to terms with the reality of the Christian growth in the Global South and the need to move the axis of the Church toward it. In 2012, however, Turkson caused many eyebrows to rise when he launched a document evoking the creation of a global agency to preside over the world’s economy. “Does he want a Soviet-type of control over the world?”– people asked. Turning to Asia, the Archbishop of Manila (Philippines), Luis Antonio Tagle (56) is another option if the Roman Catholic would turn the page in a more radical way towards becoming a less Western institution. This smiling, apparently simple, yet engaging and charming young cardinal made a positive impression at the last Synod of Bishops for the New Evangelization and attracted immediate positive feedback. A middle way solution could be the Archbishop of San Paulo (Brazil) Odilo Pedro Scherer (63), the Brazilian bishop with a German name and European “heart”. Latin America is perceived as being a continent of solid Catholic traditions (like the old Europe), yet expressing the spiritual vitality of the Global South.

An Evangelical Preference?

Given the range of possible candidates, who is the more Evangelically inclined or Evangelical-friendly? This is difficult to say. Here are three criteria that could form a list of Evangelical desires for the next conclave.

First, generally speaking, those ecclesiastical figures with first-hand experience among Evangelicals in their pastoral work tend to be more inclined toward friendly relationship with non-Catholic Christians. It is true that where the Roman Catholic Church is strongly attached to the national state in a privileged position, the leaders tend to have a more “defensive” attitude and inward-looking vision. On the contrary, where the Roman Church experiences the stresses and strains of being a religious institution in the midst of other movements and in the context of a separate political power, there the Church has a more positive attitude towards religious pluralism. To the extent that the next Pope comes from a background of interaction with the plurality of Christian experiences and orientations, the better he will be among evangelicals.

Second, those who have more global perceptions of the state of Christianity surely have a better consideration of Evangelicals than those who are grounded in regional areas where Catholics have a traditional majority status. The challenges of the persecution of Christians, global poverty, and the rising secularism of the West are common concerns that allow conversations and cooperation between different Christians. A Pope who is aware of global trends and who has knowledge of the complex geography of the Christian Churches will be in a better position to appreciate the contribution of Evangelicals around the globe.

What Is Evangelicalism?

De Chirico’s book on Roman Catholicism spends the first chapter discussing the definition of “evangelicalism.” Of course, this word has broadened in meaning considerably over the last 30 years or so. In fact, it has become so broad that many question whether it is a helpful designation of anything anymore. A professor at Fuller seminary recently called Mormons evangelical. If a term can successfully encapsulate both the Mormon faith and confessional Reformed theology, how useful a term is it, really? De Chirico acknowledges this drift of meaning: “[The] increasing vagueness of the use of the word is making its semantic value less and less precise” (p. 28). This results in a lot of hyphenated terms, in order to gain more precision, like “evangelical-Reformed,” “evangelical-Catholic,” “evangelical-liberal,” etc. De Chirico, however, does argue that there is still a core of meaning associated with the term. Historically, the movement of evangelicalism has its roots in the Reformation; theologically, it is defined as a theology of the gospel; ecclesiologically, it has embraced the concept of the denomination, with varying types of spirituality associated with them. He has a helpful diagram on p. 39. In terms of the general outlook of evangelicalism, he says that it is becoming marginalized (p. 41). The way that evangelicalism “works” is by describing a core Christianity that has essentials, and then defining other matters as adiaphora (things of indifference). He gets at a key difference among evangelicals, when he says that there are traditionalists and reformists, the former seeing “the church as (a) ‘bounded set’ whereas the latter as ‘centered set’” (p. 46). These differences among evangelicalism make it quite clear that there are significant differences among evangelicals over theological method. Historically, they have been united around the gospel, though that unity has fragmented somewhat of late. All in all, a pretty fair description of evangelicalism.

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