I know that Doug and I had another interesting conversation about baptism where Doug said that I was outside the bounds of the confession. It seems to be happening again. Here is my response.
I think that Doug is still assuming that I am holding to some kind of strict merit schema in the Covenant of Works. To issue a counter example, in our present situation, has not God promised rewards for what we do over and above salvation? One thinks of the parable of the talents, as well as 1 Corinthians 3:12-15. How can we call that a reward either, if God’s predestination eliminates man’s responsibility? (Obviously, Doug is not explicitly doing this. I’m just throwing it out there.) If God crowns His own works there, then how can it be called a reward? And yet it is a reward. God’s predestination and man’s responsibility operate on different levels. That’s why we use the very terms “first cause” and “second cause.” God rewards the second cause. That’s what would have happened in Adam’s case, as well. And just because Adam’s second cause of his obedience is not the first cause, does not make it worthless with regard to reward. Doug is implicitly holding that because Adam is not the primary cause, that therefore it cannot be rewarded. Of course, we both agree that ultimately speaking, from the point of view of God’s decree, Adam could not have done anything other than what he did do. God decreed that. However, on Adam’s level he did face the choice. And his character was innocent. Therefore, on Adam’s secondary causation level, he could have chosen to obey God. Therein lies the difference between my predestinarian schema that allows for man’s will to choose whatever is in his character to choose (and since Adam was innocent, he had it in his character to choose the right), versus the Arminian scheme, which says that man always has the power of contrary choice.
I am still wondering if Frame’s analogy holds, but in the Doctrine of God book, he uses the analogy of Shakespeare and his plays. Obviously, on the level of the author, the characters in Shakespeare’s plays cannot do anything other than what Shakespeare directs them to do. However, on the level of the play, the characters are faced with tough decisions that often could go either way. So far, I have found the analogy to be helpful. I’m sure that there is some place where the analogy falls, though I am not aware of it yet. By Doug’s argument, however, nothing could ever be called a reward for anything that we do, since God is the cause of it. Is there not the reward “Well done, good and faithful servant?” Do we have any right to expect such rewards? Or is God going to say to us, “I know that you were expecting a reward. However, since I’m the real cause of what you did, I’m not going to give you anything.” I’m sure that Doug would recoil from this way of thinking. Nevertheless, I think it is the logical outcome of his system. I hope this clears up the “accusation” that I am inadvertently abandoning Calvinism.
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Joshua said,
May 5, 2008 at 11:22 am
Ephesians 2:10
Even the works, which God rewards us for over and above His own works, are resulting from His grace: both grace in the decree, and grace in meticulously arranging circumstances so that we will choose to accomplish the works rather than fail to accomplish them.
Even on the level of the creature we must understand that Adam’s choice in innocence is not separate from the circumstances constraining the choice. The Sovereign God who decrees from eternity is the same Sovereign God who works meticulously in history to bring about all things.
For Adam to have obeyed would have required God’s work in every detail to arrange the circumstances such that Adam was not tempted above what he could bear. Innocence has its limit, just as faith does for the believer who has been redeemed in Christ. To say that Adam could have obeyed does not lead us to say that his obedience merited anything as a reward apart from God’s gracious providence.
Doug is only pointing out that your inconsistency on this point is an implicit denial of the Calvinistic understanding of God’s Sovereignty as it relates to human willing.
Adam was mutable and his obedience was contingent upon God’s grace to preserve that innocence.
Adam’s posterity are immutable in their sin nature (they cannot obey) and their obedience is contingent upon God’s grace to redeem them in Christ, into innocence.
Christ’s posterity are mutable (they can sin or obey) and is contingent upon God’s grace to keep from sinning.
Christ’s posterity are given the promise of one day being made immutable once more (they will always obey) and this is by the grace of God.
rfwhite said,
May 5, 2008 at 11:37 am
Joshua, trying to understand your position, was God’s goal for Adam that he be preserved in a state of innocence, or was God’s goal for Adam that he move from a state of innocence to another state?
Roger Mann said,
May 5, 2008 at 11:38 am
Lane wrote,
Of course, the Westminster Confession also clearly teaches that God created Adam and Eve with “the law of God written in their hearts, and power to fulfill it” (4.2), and that both their obedience and disobedience to His law was governed by His “providence” (5.1-4). Therefore, even Adam’s sinful act of disobedience was not autonomously rendered by him, but was rather “caused” by God’s providential control. Does this mean, to use Doug’s rational, that because Adam was not “the primary cause” of his sin that he could not be punished with eternal death? If not, then I fail to see why Adam could not have been “rewarded” with eternal life if he would have (hypothetically) continued to obey God during his probation. The fact that God is the ultimate “cause” of everything man does (for both evil and good) is irrelevant to the issue.
Joshua said,
May 5, 2008 at 11:49 am
rfwhite,
God’s goal was that Adam would fall into sin. If God had preserved Adam from sin, I cannot say what His goal would have been, for Scripture does not tell us.
RBerman said,
May 5, 2008 at 11:49 am
Lane, I think you’re trying to articulate WCF 6.1-2 which talks about Adam being not compelled by necessity of nature to either good or evil, and Adam having both “freedom and power” to do either good or evil. That would be more precise language than to say that “on Adam’s secondary causation level, he could have chosen to obey God” even if God had decreed otherwise. “Could” is a slippery word, and I suspect that in using it you are trying to summarize WCF 6.1-2. Is that correct?
rfwhite said,
May 5, 2008 at 11:57 am
Joshua, in 1, does Scripture tell us that “Adam was mutable and his obedience was contingent upon God’s grace to preserve that innocence”?
David Gadbois said,
May 5, 2008 at 12:08 pm
This helps reveal a pattern in FV thought – the idea that merely affirming the eternal decree of God makes you a Calvinist, even if the whole rest of your system is screwy. Obviously, they wouldn’t want to characterize it that way, that’s just my colorful description.
1. The idea behind this one seems that, if everything that comes to pass is decreed by God (which we agree with, of course), then there can be no merited, deserved, or due reward for any secondary cause.
But, then, is there any secondary cause that demerits or is due punishment? FVers seems to want to hold to the former idea, without the implications of this latter principle.
I think this helps explain why FVers dont’ see their system as being a form of moralism. As long as you hold to the eternal decree, there is no such thing as merit, so one cannot be accused of being a moralist even if you hold to a covenantal nomism pattern of religion. They do not consider that there is such thing as a predestinarian moralist (Luke 18:9-14).
2. Also, this talk about God’s “gracious decree.” Are all of God’s decrees gracious? Or are we, again, just defining “gracious” to mean “anything God doesn’t have to do” (see my comments in the “A Gracious Covenant of Works” thread)?
Roger Mann said,
May 5, 2008 at 12:31 pm
4: Joshua wrote,
Since Scripture clearly teaches that “eternal life” is the reward for perfect obedience to God’s law, it follows by “good and necessary consequence” that Adam would have merited the reward of “eternal life” if he would have remained obedient to God’s command:
And, behold, one came and said unto him, Good Master, what good thing shall I do, that I may have eternal life? And he said unto him, Why callest thou me good? there is none good but one, that is, God: but if thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments. — Matthew 19:16-17
And the commandment, which was ordained to life, I found to be unto death. — Romans 7:10
For Moses describeth the righteousness which is of the law, That the man which doeth those things shall live by them. — Romans 10:5
And the law is not of faith: but, The man that doeth them shall live in them. — Galatians 3:12
Now to him that worketh is the reward not reckoned of grace, but of debt. — Romans 4:4
Joshua said,
May 5, 2008 at 12:38 pm
rfwhite,
We can infer from Scripture that Adam was mutable because Scripture tells us that he was not sinful by nature, but that he became so through his disobedience. To be mutable in the sense I am using it (morally mutable) requires that one can move from one state (innocent) to another (guilty). That Adam was mutable may be clearly inferred from Scripture.
That Adam’s innocence required God’s grace for its preservation follows from the Scriptural statements concerning God’s complete Sovereignty over all things. Either God controls all circumstances, or He does not. The Scriptures assert that nothing is outside of God’s Will, indeed it asserts that His Will upholds all things. Therefore, we can infer that God controlled all the circumstances in the Garden that led to Adam’s sin. The implication is that God would have controlled all the circumstances in the Garden that prevented Adam’s sin, had Adam obeyed. The providential control of circumstances is grace. This statement is also supported by Scripture (e.g. Gen. 50:20).
So given Adam’s innocence and mutability and God’s meticulous providence as gracious, it follows that God’s grace would be necessary to preserve Adam’s innocence.
Joshua said,
May 5, 2008 at 12:42 pm
Roger,
Does Scripture reveal that Adam’s single act of obedience would have merited eternal life?
Perfect obedience is the standard, not singular obedience, but continual.
Scripture does not provide the premise from which we can infer that Adam’s single act of obedience would have granted him to be morally immutable, that is, able to be obedient perfectly.
If Adam had refused the initial temptation, it does not follow that he would have refused every subsequent temptation, nor does it imply that no further temptation would occur.
You are importing premises that simply are not there.
rfwhite said,
May 5, 2008 at 1:45 pm
Joshua, I sincerely appreciate your forbearance. Did Adam’s mutability require only that he be able to move from innocence to guilt? From your comment in 1, I gather that Adam’s mutability also required that he be able to move from mutable innocence to immutable innocence. Is that correct?
Joshua said,
May 5, 2008 at 2:21 pm
rfwhite,
No, that does not follow.
Adam being created mutable does not imply that he be able to become immutable.
Adam’s being created mutable does imply that he being able to move from his current state of relationship to God (innocent) to another (guilty).
Being created mutable means that Adam could remain innocent or become guilty. It does not mean that he could become immutable. Mutable/immutable and innocent/guilty are different categories of consideration.
Roger Mann said,
May 5, 2008 at 2:26 pm
10: Joshua wrote,
Scripture clearly reveals that Adam’s single act of disobedience earned or merited eternal death: “For the wages of sin is death…” (Romans 6:23). Since this is the penalty for disobeying God’s law (Galatians 3:10), it can be rightly inferred that Adam was subject to God’s law under an unspecified period of probation (see WCF 4.2):
I. God gave to Adam a law, as a covenant of works, by which he bound him and all his posterity to personal, entire, exact, and perpetual obedience; promised life upon the fulfilling, and threatened death upon the breach of it; and endued him with power and ability to keep it. (WCF 19.1)
As the Confession rightly points out, God’s law (which Adam was under “as a covenant of works”) promises “life upon the fulfilling” not only “death upon the breach of it.” That’s why Scripture plainly asserts that “the man which doeth those things shall live by them.” (Romans 10:5). Had Adam continued to obey for the duration of God’s pre-ordained probation period, he most certainly would have been “due” (Romans 4:4) the promised reward of “eternal life” (Matthew 19:16-17). Indeed, that is precisely what the “last Adam” (1 Corinthians 15:45) did: He perfectly obeyed God’s law and earned “justification of life” (Romans 5:18) for His elect people:
“For as by one man’s disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous.” — Romans 5:19
“But when the fulness of the time was come, God sent forth his Son, made of a woman, made under the law, to redeem them that were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons.” — Galatians 4:4
The premises that I’m “importing” are all right there in Scripture.
Joshua said,
May 5, 2008 at 3:05 pm
Roger,
WCF 4.2 says nothing about a “probation.” This is what it says:
“2. After God had made all other creatures, he created man, male and female, with reasonable and immortal souls, endued with knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness, after his own image; having the law of God written in their hearts, and power to fulfill it: and yet under a possibility of transgressing, being left to the liberty of their own will, which was subject unto change. Beside this law written in their hearts, they received a command, not to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; which while they kept, they were happy in their communion with God, and had dominion over the creatures.”
While they kept obedience to God’s command, they retained the blessings God freely bestowed. It does not specify that had they endured, for some unspecified time, they would have merited eternal life.
Moreover, the WCF 19, which you cite, says nothing whatsoever of “eternal life,” but states quite plainly, “life” was the result of obedience, and “death” was the result of disobedience.
The work of Christ has merited eternal life, but it is not logically entailed that because Christ’s obedience (in every case) merited eternal life, that Adam’s obedience (in one case) would have accomplished the same. The continuity between Christ and Adam is not coextensive in every point of comparison the important discontinuity being: Christ was immutable, whereas Adam was mutable.
“But the free gift is not like the transgression. For if by the transgression of the one the many died, much more did the grace of God and the gift by the grace of the one Man, Jesus Christ, abound to the many.” — Romans 5:15
Your imported premises is “eternal life” where the only available one is “life.” Adam was mutable and it is nowhere indicated that he would be made immutable as a result of one act of obedience in the face of temptation.
Rather, Adam possessed life by God’s grace, and by every moment in which he did not eat of the tree he was obedient to God and reaped life as a result. The moment he failed was the moment life was taken from him, and from all his posterity. Only by being born in Christ can we have the promise of eternal life, for THAT promise was given in Christ only. Such is the greatness of God promise in Christ, which is greater than what Adam was promised to begin with.
Joshua said,
May 5, 2008 at 3:07 pm
On an additional note, I must bow out of the discussion, otherwise it is assured that I will not merit much of anything in this life by way of work!
rfwhite said,
May 5, 2008 at 4:00 pm
It is certainly true that mutable/immutable and innocent/guilty are different categories of consideration. The point of my question in 11 was whether Adam’s future state was the same as or different from his original state.
greenbaggins said,
May 5, 2008 at 5:03 pm
Rey, why do you persistently ignore the difference between pre-Fall and post-Fall? This makes all the difference. The idea that I am Pelagian is absolutely ludicrous.
Mark said,
May 5, 2008 at 5:55 pm
I think this has already been said but is being missed:
The Reformed confess that Adam was not merely innocent or created in a state of innocence.
The Reformed confess that Adam was created righteous.
Arminians believe that Adam could only be merely innocent until he made himself righteous. The Reformed know that righteousness was a gift from God. Adam did not need to become righteous, he had already been made that way.
rfwhite said,
May 5, 2008 at 6:44 pm
Mark, re: 19, thanks for bringing up the point that Adam was not merely created innocent, but also created righteous … unconfirmed but present nonetheless.
tim prussic said,
May 5, 2008 at 7:06 pm
#17 – clueless.
#19 – I agree, but I wonder what your target is. No one (that I’m aware of) has argued for Adam’s mere innocence. It seems that folks argue for further blessing for Adam, and that thought covenant keeping. The connection to Arminianism is interesting. I’ve just been reading Turretin on that.
rfwhite said,
May 5, 2008 at 7:29 pm
tim prussic, I think what Mark is driving at is the emphasis on innocence in Lane’s original post.
Roger Mann said,
May 6, 2008 at 9:28 am
14: Joshua wrote,
I’m not sure how you figure that WCF 4.2 says “nothing about a probation.” While it may not use the word “probation” per se, it plainly states that Adam and Eve’s “communion with God” was conditioned upon their obedience. So they were most definitely under a period of “probation” due to the terms of the covenant:
“Beside this law written in their hearts, they received a command, not to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; which while they kept, they were happy in their communion with God, and had dominion over the creatures.” — WCF 4.2
Furthermore, WFC 19.1 clearly states that the law Adam was under as a covenant of works “promised life upon the fulfilling, and threatened death upon the breach of it.” So, this “probation” period entailed both a positive reward and a negative penalty. Moreover, just as the “death” that was threatened was not merely temporal but rather eternal death, the “life” that was promised “upon the fulfilling” of God’s law was not merely the temporal/losable life that Adam was endued with at his creation but rather eternal life, as the context clearly indicates.
Finally, Scripture itself explicitly teaches that the “life” promised upon the fulfilling of God’s law is “eternal life” (Matthew 19:16-17), as I’ve pointed out several times now. How else do you surmise that Jesus — the “last Adam” — earned “eternal life” for His elect people? Was it not on the basis “upon the fulfilling” of God’s law on our behalf? If so (and it clearly is), then the law itself promises “eternal life” as the reward for fulfilling its precepts, and this same reward would have applied to the first Adam who was likewise under God’s law.
Well, to begin with, Christ’s human nature was clearly mutable; otherwise He couldn’t have been born a baby, grown to maturity, nor died a substitutionary death on the cross. So there was no difference between Adam and Christ in that respect. Moreover, the point is that both the first and second Adam’s were under the same moral law that promised the same “eternal life” as its reward.
No, that is not an “imported” premise, but rather the plain teaching of Scripture and the obvious meaning of the Confession, as I’ve demonstrated above. Eternal life has always been the goal of mankind, not merely temporal/losable life.
Joshua said,
May 6, 2008 at 10:20 am
@ Roger, #23
“Conditioned upon their obedience” – and where does it say the conditions of obedience acquire more than they possessed? Your assumption is that the Confession indicates a specific time-span, where it does nothing of the sort.
“Beside this law written in their hearts, they received a command, not to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; which while they kept, they were happy in their communion with God, and had dominion over the creatures.” — WCF 4.2
Yes, while they kept it. Were they not keeping it prior to the temptation? Your assumption is that there is some time period of testing, but in Genesis there is no such indication of a limited period. The command is simply, “This is what you have been given, don’t eat this one thing, and you shall continue in it.” There is no stipulation of time for some greater reward for obedience. Adam and Eve possessed all the abundance God had provided. To obey was to live on in it.
Roger:
“Furthermore, WFC 19.1 clearly states that the law Adam was under as a covenant of works “promised life upon the fulfilling, and threatened death upon the breach of it.” So, this “probation” period entailed both a positive reward and a negative penalty.”
Yes, there is a reward and a penalty, but where does it indicate in Genesis that the reward is greater than what has already been given freely? The reward was to continue in the abundant life they already possessed.
Roger:
Finally, Scripture itself explicitly teaches that the “life” promised upon the fulfilling of God’s law is “eternal life” (Matthew 19:16-17), as I’ve pointed out several times now. How else do you surmise that Jesus — the “last Adam” — earned “eternal life” for His elect people? Was it not on the basis “upon the fulfilling” of God’s law on our behalf? If so (and it clearly is), then the law itself promises “eternal life” as the reward for fulfilling its precepts, and this same reward would have applied to the first Adam who was likewise under God’s law.
My contention is not that eternal life results from the fulfillment of the Law. Clearly if Adam continued to live without ever sinning he would have continued to live. My contention is that this requirement would have been perpetual rather than limited to a period of probation, the fulfillment of which would lead to glorification or immutability with regard to righteousness.
Adam was created mutable as to righteousness (notice this is not referring to physical mutability), so that obedience and disobedience were always potential for him. We have no indication that Adam’s fulfillment of the Law would have received immutability as to righteousness. God does not promise to remake Adam in a glorified state.
Roger:
Well, to begin with, Christ’s human nature was clearly mutable; otherwise He couldn’t have been born a baby, grown to maturity, nor died a substitutionary death on the cross. So there was no difference between Adam and Christ in that respect. Moreover, the point is that both the first and second Adam’s were under the same moral law that promised the same “eternal life” as its reward.
Christ’s human nature was mutable physically, but Christ’s person was immutable as to righteousness. He could not sin–he was immutable in this sense. Adam did not possess this quality. Thus, the difference that makes all the difference.
Adam’s life, and its continuance, was on the basis of his continued obedience. So long as Adam obeyed, he would have life. This is the only logical implication found in the CoW. In the CoG Christ, who is immutable, fulfills the requirements of the law eternally (CoW), thereby meriting for His people eternal life (CoG).
The only way that Adam could have retained life was to continue in obedience. God would have had to keep Adam from circumstances that would have led to sin. God did not do this in order to manifest His abundant grace by uniting us to Himself in Christ in a way that was not intended in the CoW with Adam (for had it been intended, surely God would have brought it to pass).
So let me be clear about what I’m saying:
Adam was created mutable as to righteousness.
The promise in the CoW is life on the basis of obedience.
Nowhere in Scripture is a period of probation implied.
Therefore, eternal life in the CoW requires eternal obedience.
Mutable Adam was obedient only insofar as God kept Adam from circumstances beyond which he could bear.
For mutable Adam to gain eternal life, mutable Adam would have had to be remade immutable, or be kept from temptation leading to sin by God’s Providence
God did not intend to remake Adam, or to keep him from temptation unto sin.
Instead, God intended Christ, who is immutable as to righteousness, to be obedient eternally where Adam was not.
Because Christ is eternally obedient, he merits for His people eternal life.
I hope it is clear now that my major disagreement is with the idea of probation, the fulfillment of which would have merited Adam immutability as to righteousness. The idea of probation is pure speculation, nowhere indicated in Scripture.
I was not clear before on the distinction between life and eternal life, but that should be clear at this point.
~Joshua
rfwhite said,
May 6, 2008 at 10:34 am
Joshua, perhaps I am misunderstanding you, but it seems to me that it is really not the case that you deny probation. Rather it is that, on your analysis, Adam is in an unending state of probation, at any moment of which he could lose his life by sinning. Where am I wrong? I’m happy to be corrected if I’ve misinterpreted you.
Joshua said,
May 6, 2008 at 10:45 am
@ rfwhite
I suppose so, although I’d hang the emphasis on Adam’s created nature rather than a covenant stipulation (not that the covenant stipulation isn’t important!)
I believe Adam was obligated to glorify God and enjoy Him forever. Being mutable as to righteousness means that at any point Adam could have failed to obey.
I see the promise of immutable righteousness as something we are promises and shall possess in Christ, who by His own nature, is immutable as to righteousness.
We know that God did not intend for Adam to be made immutable, because Adam sinned. Why then is it assumed that had Adam not sinned, God would therefore need to make him immutable? The attempts to approach the logic implications of “what ifs” is often mind-numbing. I prefer to stick to what we can know about what has happened and will happen.
rfwhite said,
May 6, 2008 at 11:15 am
Joshua, when you speak of what God intended or did not intend, do you presume preceptive or decretive intention?
MarkC said,
May 6, 2008 at 12:20 pm
Joshua, when you speak of what God intended or did not intend, do you presume preceptive or decretive intention?
Some care ought to be taken when talking about preceptive intention. God commands all men everywhere to repent. Does he intend that they do so?
Jeff Cagle said,
May 6, 2008 at 1:03 pm
Joshua (#26):
The attempts to approach the logic implications of “what ifs” is often mind-numbing.
Exactly so. I mean, if we are going to suppose that Adam “would have” succeeded in resisting temptation, then we would have to imagine a completely different world in which God the Son was not decreed to take on flesh to be our sin substitute.
So then, what would we make of 1 Cor 15 that declares that we must be transformed from mortality to immortality in order to inherit the kingdom of God? In our hypothetical world, all other things being equal, when and how would that transformation take place? Or would it even be necessary?
I think it is this consideration, along with Gen. 3.22 (”He must not be allowed to reach out his hand and take also from the tree of life and eat, and live forever”) that drives the idea that Adam would have received eternal life as a reward for resisting temptation.
The argument would then run:
* Adam and his race would have to be transformed in order to be in eternal fellowship with God, and
* Jesus would not provide that transformation for us, so
* The transformation would have to have been acquired by Adam.
But it’s all hypothetical! Adam didn’t … so there. That is to say, if we imagine a completely different world, we are trying to break some rules while keeping others the same — and nothing in particular justifies our choice of rules to break. Maybe if Adam hadn’t fallen, then flesh-and-blood could have inherited the kingdom. Or maybe not.
And that’s why I think this is the weakest link in your argument:
God did not intend to remake Adam, or to keep him from temptation unto sin.
expressed also as
We know that God did not intend for Adam to be made immutable, because Adam sinned.
Very true — at the level of what actually did happen. But in our hypothetical world, if God had not intended the fall, would He then have not intended to make Adam immutable? I have no idea — because we don’t really know the consequences of changing this one feature (the Fall) about the cosmos.
That’s my only objection, really; other than that, I happily agree with you that the world we have is the world God wanted to give us, and that in point of fact, our eternal life comes through Jesus.
Hypothetically yours,
Jeff Cagle
rfwhite said,
May 6, 2008 at 1:19 pm
MarkC, re: 28, thanks. Yes, that’s exactly the point of the question in 27: care ought to be taken when speaking of God’s intention. Does Joshua’s sentence — “We know that God did not intend for Adam to be made immutable, because Adam sinned” — work if God’s intention is other than decretive?
Roger Mann said,
May 6, 2008 at 1:28 pm
24: Joshua wrote,
Joshua, the fact that the law Adam was under “promised life upon the fulfilling” of it (WCF 19.1) is what indicates a specific time-span. The law’s promise of “eternal life” (Matthew 19:16-17) could never have been attained by Adam unless his “fulfilling” of its demands had a point of termination. Since Scripture clearly teaches that Adam’s period of probation ended when he failed the test to obey God’s command in Genesis 3, that would have also likely been the point of time his probation would have ended had he obeyed.
You asked, “where does it say the conditions of obedience acquire more than they possessed?” Since Scripture explicitly states that the reward for fulfilling the law is “eternal life” (Matthew 19:16-17), then clearly the life promised “upon the fulfilling” of the law in WFC 19.1 is likewise “eternal life.” Adam already possessed temporal/losable life at his creation, but the “promise” is for a type of life that Adam did not already possess at creation — eternal/non-losable life — conditioned upon his obedience during the period of probation.
Ok, but Scripture explicitly states that the reward for fulfilling the law is “eternal life” (Matthew 19:16-17), and that those who possess eternal life “shall never perish” (John 10:28). Thus, the “life” that Adam was promised “upon the fulfilling” of the law was clearly “eternal life” and would have confirmed him in righteousness in a glorified state had he attained it.
There’s one huge problem with this thesis. As the “second Adam” under God’s law, Christ was not “obedient eternally” — He was “obedient to the point of death, even the death of the cross” (Philippians 2:8). Therefore, if Christ was able to fulfill the law and merit “eternal life” for His elect people in a limited duration of time, then Adam could have likewise (speaking hypothetically of course) fulfilled the law and merited “eternal life” for his posterity in a limited duration of time. That limited duration of time would have been his period of “probation” under God’s law in the CoW.
rfwhite said,
May 6, 2008 at 1:29 pm
To hitch-hike on Jeff’s reference to 1 Cor 15, was Adam created to be in an unending state of being able to die, or was there opportunity to move from the state of able to die to the state of not being able to die?
MarkC said,
May 6, 2008 at 2:01 pm
rfwhite re #30
Does God have intentions other than his decree? IOW does he accomplish his intentions or does he intend something else?
Jeff Cagle said,
May 6, 2008 at 4:08 pm
That’s the launching point for the discussion about the free offer of the gospel.
Here’s a test case: is it God’s will that we abstain from sexual immorality?
Yes. Absolutely — 1 Thess. 4.3.
No, not decretally.
rfwhite said,
May 6, 2008 at 4:20 pm
MarkC, for the sake of this exchange, I was using “intention” interchangably with “will,” as Jeff suggests in 34. Nothing more. Hence, my question for Joshua: was it God’s will for Adam that he ever cease to be able to die and thereafter to be not able to die?
David Gadbois said,
May 6, 2008 at 5:38 pm
Roger said There’s one huge problem with this thesis. As the “second Adam” under God’s law, Christ was not “obedient eternally” — He was “obedient to the point of death, even the death of the cross” (Philippians 2:8).
Indeed. When I read Josh’s post, the High Priestly Prayer in John 17, especially vs. 4-5, came to mind. Jesus had accomplished the Father’s work, so it was fitting for God to glorify Jesus at the end of his mortal life and ministry.
“It is finished”, after all.
Josh’s view is hopelessly idiosyncratic.
Joshua said,
May 6, 2008 at 5:52 pm
God commanded Adam not to sin.
God willed that Adam sin.
God is not required to fulfill the prescriptions that he demands of His creatures. There is nothing “possible” in God’s willing. God’s will accomplishes all that comes to pass. In a very strict sense then, it is impossible that Adam abstain from sin, for God did not will it so.
There a real problem with using elements in the Covenant of Grace to read back into the Garden its rewards in Christ.
It is entirely “possible” that Adam’s obedience would have gained him immutable righteousness before God, but there is no logical necessity for assuming that such a result is certain given the possibility.
Such is the entire problem with the argument. As Jeff said, the outcome of our hypothetical constructions depends upon what elements of the actual we retain and those we alter according to the change of destiny.
In my hypothetical, I refuse to assume (and it IS an assumption) that what Christ merits for us is identical to what Adam would have merited had he obeyed. Adam is a type of Christ, not Christ Himself. As with an analogy, a type is not identical to its comparative object. I’ve tried to point this out in one specific way that we actually know (Adam’s mutability, Christ’s immutability), while avoiding things that are impossible to know (Adam would be made immutable had he obeyed).
The only positive reason for even investing time and energy into the discussion of Adam’s hypothetical obedience is to point out that his merit even in this hypothetical would still be dependent entirely upon God’s decree and providence, therefore not upon Adam’s autonomous will. Beyond that what use is there to concentrate on what is not, when what is –Christ Himself–is where our hope is found.
Does anyone else get the impression that such attention to Adam’s merit is little more than a detraction from God’s good pleasure in Christ? Is it not similar to speculating on what temple worship would look like today had Israel remained faithful?
Mark C. said,
May 6, 2008 at 6:03 pm
MarkC, for the sake of this exchange, I was using “intention” interchangably with “will,” as Jeff suggests in 34. Nothing more.
Yes I know. Let’s rephrase. Does God will other than his decree? IOW does he accomplish his will or does he want something else?
Hence, my question for Joshua: was it God’s will for Adam that he ever cease to be able to die and thereafter to be not able to die?
It was God’s will that Adam fall. That is all.
Mark
Jeff Cagle said,
May 6, 2008 at 6:11 pm
The only positive reason for even investing time and energy into the discussion of Adam’s hypothetical obedience is to point out that his merit even in this hypothetical would still be dependent entirely upon God’s decree and providence, therefore not upon Adam’s autonomous will. Beyond that what use is there to concentrate on what is not, when what is –Christ Himself–is where our hope is found.
I would add one additional benefit, but no more: it is worthwhile to emphasize that the respective federal heads entirely acquired the result for their respective people. Without that feature, we are left with a lacuna of acquisition that must be fulfilled by our own works. And to that extent, talking about Adam’s role as federal head adds to rather than detracts from our understanding of Christ’s work.
Aside from that, I’m happy to let the hypothetical question of what would have become of Adam sit on my shelf next to “Enumerations of Angels Performing Liturgical Gyrations on the Ends of Sewing Implements.”
Jeff Cagle
Joshua said,
May 6, 2008 at 6:13 pm
Roger and David,
My main concern is predominantly this:
Adam isn’t Christ.
Adam was never intended to gain for us what Christ gains for us.
Had God willed Adam to obey, Adam would be obliged to give God glory for his obedience.
Indeed, Christ gives God glory for what God has ordained through him when he prays in John 17.
Adam shall be the sinner he was ordained to be and Christ shall be our all in all.
Joshua said,
May 6, 2008 at 6:15 pm
Jeff,
Excellent addition and thanks for the exchange.
tim prussic said,
May 6, 2008 at 7:02 pm
Joshua, I’m coming late, so forgive me if I miss the mark, but no one is loopy enough to argue that God wanted Adam to succeed in the COW. Adam’s not Christ, but Christ is the Last Adam. I think folks on my side of the bar are arguing for a thorough covenant structure in the Garden with Adam, which in turn, is quite similar to the covenant structure with the Last Adam. Both heads of distinct, but similar covenants: both with promises and both with threats; both with blessings and both with curses. Adam procured the curses and the Last Adam the blessings, all according to the will of God.
Both Adams, again, were heads of respective covenants, replete with all the covenantal trappings. I think that’s the issue, or at least one of the issues.
rfwhite said,
May 6, 2008 at 8:23 pm
Mark C, your claim is true only if you define God’s will as decretive. I agree with Joshua and with you, and have not said otherwise than, that God’s decretive will was that Adam fall.
Roger Mann said,
May 7, 2008 at 8:59 am
40: Joshua wrote,
Joshua, if by “intended” you mean that it was not God’s decretive will that Adam gain for us what Christ gains, I wholeheartedly agree. But it was indeed God’s preceptive will that Adam obey His commands to gain the reward of eternal life, for the “promise” of eternal life is inseparably connected with God’s moral law — “For Moses writes about the righteousness which is of the law, ‘The man who does those things shall live by them’” (Romans 10:5; cf. Matthew 19:16-17). And this is the main concern that have with your view: It denies that the “promise” of eternal life given in the law would have applied equally to Adam as it did to Christ. But, of course, if that’s what God’s law “promises,” then it must apply equally to whoever fulfills its demands — God’s perfect justice allows for nothing less.
I somewhat agree with that, for Christ most certainly “glorified” the Father in John 17. However, it is also true that Jesus asked God to “glorify” Himself because of the work He had accomplished: “Glorify Your Son, that Your Son may also glorify You…I have finished the work which You have given Me to do. And now, O Father, glorify Me together with Yourself…” (John 17:1-5). Moreover, Scripture plainly declares that if a man is in fact “justified by works, [he] has hath whereof to glory” (Romans 4:2). The fact that no one this side of the Fall (other than Christ Himself) is able to fulfill the law and be “justified by works” in no way negates this biblical principle. The fact is, if Adam would have fulfilled the law (by God’s sustaining power no less — Acts 17:28), he would have been due the reward of eternal life on the basis of God’s covenant “promise.” This too would have “glorified” God.
Joshua said,
May 7, 2008 at 9:24 am
Roger,
God is not divided. His will is one and He wills one thing. The precepts He gives are directives, but it does not follow from these commands that God wills them to be fulfilled in every way by everyone. God commanded Adam to obey, fully willing that Adam disobey, in order that Christ might obey instead. This is not capriciousness, which is often the charge against God who commands one thing and wills another. God is just, and He defines justice. If God gives a command and wills it to be broken in order that His glory be manifest in a greater way, this is just.
God is not obligated to give a command that everyone can fulfill. God determines what can and cannot be. To draw a distinction between what God decrees and wills what God commands and does not will preserves the unity of God’s thought and will. To ascribe to God two separate and contrary wills is to make God schizophrenic and illogical: willing one thing while simultaneously willing its opposite.
This is why hypothetical speculations about Adam are fallacious when they ascribe elements of Christ’s work to what would have occurred had God willed something else. It supposes that God’s justice requires something equivalent for a world that would be completely different. God’s justice has but one manifestation, and we are living in it. To speculate on how it would be manifest in some other existence flirts with vanity.
Your desire for equivalence between Christ and Adam presumes that God’s justice must treat each federal head in the same manner in order to be preserved. But God’s justice is not something that can be abstracted from what He has indeed willed. To speculate on what justice would look like in an alternative existence is to speculate on a different God to put it quite plainly.
Joshua said,
May 7, 2008 at 9:33 am
Tim you said,
“Joshua, I’m coming late, so forgive me if I miss the mark, but no one is loopy enough to argue that God wanted Adam to succeed in the COW”
But this is precisely what is being argued when God’s will is divided according to His decree and His precepts. God’s decrees determine what will be. God’s precepts command what is God’s due. That the commands are binding upon all does not entail that it be God’s will for all to follow them. The distinction between actually following and the possibility of follow is commonly introduced at this point, but nothing is “possible” with God, for His decrees determine all that will be. If I am reprobate in the mind of God, I cannot possibly follow His prescriptive will, and this is as He has desired it to be.
God may do what He will with His creation, and what He wills is always just. It is not only unnecessary to try and vindicate God through dividing His will in order to allow something possible while actually denying it, but it is also folly because it is an illogical construction, which makes God into a schizophrenic.
Joshua said,
May 7, 2008 at 9:35 am
Tim you said,
“Joshua, I’m coming late, so forgive me if I miss the mark, but no one is loopy enough to argue that God wanted Adam to succeed in the COW”
But this is precisely what is being argued when God’s will is divided according to His decree and His precepts. God’s decrees determine what will be. God’s precepts command what is God’s due. That the commands are binding upon all does not entail that it be God’s will for all to follow them. The distinction between actually following and the possibility of follow is commonly introduced at this point, but nothing is “possible” with God, for His decrees determine all that will be. If I am reprobate in the mind of God, I cannot possibly follow His prescriptive will, and this is as He has desired it to be.
God may do what He will with His creation, and what He wills is always just. It is not only unnecessary to try and vindicate God through dividing His will in order to allow something possible while actually denying it, but it is also folly because it is an illogical construction, which makes God into a schizophrenic.
David Gadbois said,
May 7, 2008 at 10:07 am
Tim and Joshua,
You are both well outside traditional Calvinism in denying that God has a preceptive will. This is a long-established distinction, and you can read up on it in any Reformed systematic theology (Turretin, Hodge, Berkhof, whoever). Even hypercalvinism, while overemphasizing the decretal will over the preceptive will, does not deny the preceptive.
MarkC said,
May 7, 2008 at 10:21 am
You are both well outside traditional Calvinism in denying that God has a preceptive will.
Neither has denied the ‘preceptive will’ of God properly understood which seems to have been clearly stated. Josh said “God’s decrees determine what will be. God’s precepts command what is God’s due.” How does a consistent Calvinist disagree with that? You are not suggesting that God wants what he can’t have and does what he doesn’t intend are you?
Mark
David Gadbois said,
May 7, 2008 at 10:26 am
MarkC, Joshua affirmed the existence of “precepts”, not of a preceptive will.
If it is a “will”, then desire, intention, and “want” come along with that. God sometimes desires things that He does not decree will come to pass.
Joshua said,
May 7, 2008 at 10:33 am
David,
The issue is a matter of definition and distinction. I’m not denying that God has given commands and precepts. The matter is the question, “What is God’s Will?” Can will something (I will that all men obey my law) and also its contrary (I decree that no men shall obey my law)?
What God commands is not the same as what God wills. If God truly willed that his precepts be followed by all men, then all men would follow them, for God accomplishes all that He wills.
The only construction that preserves the unity of God’s will and does not depart into contradiction is to distinguish God’s commanding from His willing. There is no caprice in God’s willing against His commands because He has also willed a more glorious fulfillment of them in Christ and on behalf of those who could not keep God’s commands, but who trust in Christ to fulfill them on their behalf.
There is nothing unorthodox about such a position.
Joshua said,
May 7, 2008 at 10:36 am
David,
You make God schizophrenic and illogical: “I want men to obey,” (preceptive will) but “I also want them to disobey” (decretive will).
Rather God wills that His commands be broken in order that Christ would fulfill them on our behalf.
MarkC said,
May 7, 2008 at 10:46 am
If it is a “will”, then desire, intention, and “want” come along with that.
If indeed. What is it to “will” David? Does God will what does not come to pass?
God sometimes desires things that He does not decree will come to pass.
Is that a fact? How do you know that? Name some for me. I’m trying to wrap my mind around the idea that God has unfulfilled desires. He declares the end from the beginning and does ALL his pleasure, He work all things after the counsel of his will, he does his will in the armies of heaven and among the sons of men, he turns the heart wherever he wills, determines the answer of the tongue and all the time he is doing this he desires something else. Huh! Who’d a thunk it?
Mark
David Gadbois said,
May 7, 2008 at 11:00 am
You make God schizophrenic and illogical: “I want men to obey,” (preceptive will) but “I also want them to disobey” (decretive will).
That would only be a logical contradiction if God willed it *in the same sense*.
There is certainly a sense in which God does not “desire the death of the wicked.” Yet he decretively wills it anyway.
I don’t have much time at the moment. A good online resource on the issue can be found here:
http://www.desiringgod.org/ResourceLibrary/Articles/ByDate/1995/1580_Are_There_Two_Wills_in_God/
MarkC said,
May 7, 2008 at 11:12 am
That is, without a doubt, the worst thing Piper has ever written.
its.reed said,
May 7, 2008 at 11:23 am
David & Josh:
David: sounds to me like Josh is quibbling over the use of “will” in two senses, in that he believes it necessarily results in an unnecessary condundrum and/or logical contradiction.
My thought is that reading Josh both charitably and consistently with his expressions, he is at least 99% consistent with the traditional reformed position. Whether or not that 1% is critical remains to be seen. My reaction at this point is probably not.
Josh: David is pointing out that generations before, who have a reputation for being more well versed in such rational efforts as logic, rightly recognized your concern and nevertheless were able to differentiate between decretive and preceptive will.
My concern is that you seem to be working very hard at offering distinctions and clarifications that at least sound/appear novel even though they really aren’t. You seem to want to do so out of a disatisfaction with the traditional epxressions (decretal vs. preceptive wills of God). Yet, as I think about your distinctions I don’t sense anything truly new or better than what’s already been formulated by men like Calvin and Turretin.
While novelty in theological development is not inherently wrong, there is always a danger that needs to be heeded. Namely, in an effort to fix apparent problems, the solution ends us worse than the problem. I want to emphasize the word “apparent” here, as I think your quibble is not necessary.
Josh, have you read extensively on this issue of decretive vs. preceptive? And if so, in what ways are you disatisfied with the distinctions offered in the traditional reformed expressions? Are you sure that your quibble(s) is targeted at a valid weakness, or possibly at a wrong perception?
Roger Mann said,
May 7, 2008 at 11:41 am
45: Joshua wrote,
I never claimed otherwise, so I’m not sure what you are going on about. I quite clearly stated, “if by ‘intended’ you mean that it was not God’s decretive will that Adam gain for us what Christ gains, I wholeheartedly agree.” I’m not sure what part of that you didn’t understand, but I’m in no way “dividing” God’s will. God accomplishes everything that He “wants” or “desires” to accomplish in accordance with His sovereign decree. It was God’s “intention” that Adam disobey His command; therefore God “caused” Adam to disobey His command. Adam could do no different — for God is sovereign and man is not “free” in any sense in relation to God.
But, again, that in no way changes the fact that God’s preceptive will (i.e., His Law) “commands” obedience and “promises” the reward of eternal life to those who comply with its demands — for “The man who does those things shall live by them’” (Romans 10:5; cf. Matthew 19:16-17). Are you seriously suggesting that God’s “commands” and “promises” are vain — that He would withhold the promised reward from the man who meets the requirements of His law?
Again, this is the main concern that have with your view: It denies that the “promise” of eternal life given in the law would have applied equally to Adam as it did to Christ. But, of course, if that’s what God’s law “promises,” then it must apply equally to whoever fulfills its demands — God’s perfect justice allows for nothing less.
I have not done that. If you pay close attention to what I wrote, you’ll see that I never ascribed “intention” or “desire” to God’s preceptive will. I happen to agree with you on that point and disagree with those who are claiming otherwise on this blog. As I mentioned above, God accomplishes everything that He “wants” or “desires” to accomplish in accordance with His sovereign decree.
No, my desire for “equivalence” between Christ and Adam presumes that God’s attribute of justice must be applied “equally” in regard to His law. Just as all who violate His law are due “eternal death,” all who fulfill His law are due “eternal life” (for that is what God “promises” in His law). Thus, if (i.e., hypothetically) Adam had fulfilled the demands of God’s law, he would have been due “eternal life” on behalf of his posterity. The fact that God decreed that this would not actually happen (and that only Christ would fulfill the law on behalf of His elect seed) is irrelevant to the point I’m making. Your charge that this amounts to speculating “on a different God” is just plain silly.
Roger Mann said,
May 7, 2008 at 11:50 am
55: MarkC, wrote,
I completely agree. Nothing I have written here should be misconstrued to be saying what Piper is saying.
MarkC said,
May 7, 2008 at 11:52 am
“The will of God is one and most simple.” Elenctics Vol 1 P 220
That should tell us where Turretin stands. God is a simple being and has one singular will.
“Hence have arisen various distinctions of the will of God. The first and principal distinction is that of the decretive and preceptive will. The former means that which God wills to do, or permits himself; the latter what he wills that we should do…the former cannot be resisted and is always fulfilled (Rom. 9:19)…the latter is often violated by men (Mt. 23:27)” ibid p 220
Turretin causes problems here in using the word will in lieu of the more proper command. (emboldened) What God wills that we do, we most certainly do. We do not necessarily do what He commands. That Turretin himself recognizes the distinction is clear in the following quote.
“The will of decree may be that which determines the events of things, but the will of precept that which prescribes man his duty. Therefore God can (without contradiction) will as to precept what he does not will as to decree inasmuch as he wills to prescribe something to man, but does not will to effect it (as he willed Pharaoh to release the people, but yet nilled their actual release.) ibid p 221
Now the above can just as accurately be translated in the following manner.
“The will of decree may be that which determines the events of things, but the command that which prescribes man his duty. Therefore God can (without contradiction) command what he does not will as to decree inasmuch as he wills to prescribe something to man, [i.e. he commands] but does not will to effect it (as he commanded Pharaoh to release the people, but yet [did not] will their actual release.)
Joshua said,
May 7, 2008 at 12:15 pm
@ its.reed #56
I’ve no problem with the tradition, insofar as I understand it, which is to say, not much at all.
My quibble is not with the language itself, but with how I’m seeing it used. Despite David’s claims that he is not using decretive will and prescriptive will in the same sense, he appears to be doing just that when he says that God wants one thing and accomplishes another. He should rather affirm that God commands one thing and accomplishes another. Mark’s quotation and explication of Turretin proves this with clarity.
When applied to Adam, it is a denial of the proper distinction to say that God wanted or intended Adam to obey but decreed that Adam fall. God’s intention, as I am taking it, is a result of His desire. God will have what He desires. God desired Adam to sin, therefore Adam sinned. God desired to give a command to Adam, therefore Adam was under God’s command. God did not desire for Adam to obey the command, otherwise Adam would have obeyed, for God will have what God desires.
This is the simplest of logical constructions and avoids the massive confusion of saying that God’s wants and desires can be different than what actually occurs by His decree.
Joshua said,
May 7, 2008 at 12:21 pm
Roger,
You asked:
Are you seriously suggesting that God’s “commands” and “promises” are vain — that He would withhold the promised reward from the man who meets the requirements of His law?
Of course God doesn’t withhold the reward to those whom obey, but how can one obey unless God has decreed it so? God did not decree that Adam obey, therefore Adam did not obey. From the command in Genesis alone, which fully describes what God promised to Adam the logical relationship is thus expressed:
Do this and die: Do not this and live.
That is all that can be logically implied. Everything else requires additional premises to be brought into a hypothetical situation that has no logical ground in reality–which is to say that it is trying to guess what God would do if God were not the God who has done. How could God do differently than He wills unless He was a different God, unless you wish to separate God’s willing from His character?
David Gadbois said,
May 7, 2008 at 1:14 pm
Turretin causes problems here in using the word will in lieu of the more proper command. (emboldened) What God wills that we do, we most certainly do. We do not necessarily do what He commands. That Turretin himself recognizes the distinction is clear in the following quote.
This is certainly a bizarre take. Are we really to think that God is indifferent about what he commands? That he has no desire for his law to be followed? It is just too much to believe that God has no will or desire behind his commands. It is not just arbitrary that Turretin retains the word “will” here in describing this.
I cannot think of any Reformed theologian who believed that God was indifferent or had no intentionality behind the preceptive will.
Sorry, guys, you are in hypercalvinist territory (if not beyond).
Do I indeed delight in the death of the wicked, says the Lord GOD, and not rather in his turning from his way that he might live?
I do not delight in the death of the one who dies, says the Lord; so turn and live
Jeff Cagle said,
May 7, 2008 at 1:25 pm
Joshua (#many):
I am very sympathetic to the concern not to have God be schizophrenic. And I’m entirely happy to place a hard line between God’s decrees and his commands.
Unfortunately, the Scripture uses the term “will” to refer to God’s commands, so I feel morally obligated to take that at face value:
“This is God’s will for you, that you should abstain from sexual immorality…” (1 Thess. 4.3)
David Gadbois’ reference to Ezekiel 18.23 also puts a boundary on how far we can simplify God’s will.
There is a further problem: what happens if we say (as you have in #52) that God does not actually *want* for people to obey His commands?
In short, the way that Scripture presents “God’s will” is not as simple as a pure decreetive model.
Jeff Cagle
David Gadbois said,
May 7, 2008 at 1:28 pm
Despite David’s claims that he is not using decretive will and prescriptive will in the same sense, he appears to be doing just that when he says that God wants one thing and accomplishes another
That’s not quite right. I said that God desires one thing (that we follow his commands), in one sense, and that God desires, in another sense, another thing (that individuals sometimes disobey the commands). He infallibly effects only the latter to come to pass. There is no contradiction in that.
MarkC said,
May 7, 2008 at 2:23 pm
This is certainly a bizarre take. Are we really to think that God is indifferent about what he commands?
It’s hard to tell what you might think. Where is the suggestion of indifference or justification for inferring it? God certainly has a reason for commanding what he commands. The errant assumption on your part is that he desires (in some sense which always remains undefined ) that it be obeyed. What is clearly obvious, because God is God, is that in those instances when it is disobeyed it is exactly what he intended and that for his own good purpose. Why you are having difficulty with the logic of it all is baffling.
That he has no desire for his law to be followed?
Oh of course he wants it to be followed. That is why he willed that it not be followed and that no doubt subsequent to a rousing internal battle where he decided between competing desires. God wills one thing in one sense and wills its antithesis in another sense and such a thing makes perfect sense. Sure.
It is just too much to believe that God has no will or desire behind his commands. It is not just arbitrary that Turretin retains the word “will” here in describing this.
One can read Turretin and understand what he means given the language he uses if one takes into account all that he says. It seems to me that the problem lies with your understanding.
“The will of God is one and most simple.” Uh…except when it isn’t.
I cannot think of any Reformed theologian who believed that God was indifferent or had no intentionality behind the preceptive will.
Of course he did and no one suggested otherwise. (One might even think that the command came so that sin might become utterly sinful) But that you think someone suggested an absence of intention explains a good deal and doesn’t bode well for this exchange.
Sorry, guys, you are in hypercalvinist territory (if not beyond).
Yeah. Have a nice day.
Jeff Cagle said,
May 7, 2008 at 2:41 pm
Why you are having difficulty with the logic of it all is baffling.
Yes, I freely admit having difficulty with the logic of it all. I have a lot of trouble reconciling
(1) God’s simplicity,
(2) the certainty that what God’s will comes to pass, and
(3) a clear expression in 1 Thess. 4.3 that God has willed something (that His people abstain from sexual immorality) that has clearly not come to pass.
Those three premises baffle me greatly, but all appear to be self-evidently true. If you have any good ways to reconcile them, I’m listening.
JRC
Roger Mann said,
May 7, 2008 at 2:50 pm
61: Joshua wrote,
If all we had to work with was “the command in Genesis alone,” you might have a valid point. But we have further revelation which clearly reveals that God’s promise of life in His law is “eternal life” (the same “eternal life” that Jesus earned by fulfilling the law) not merely perpetual “conditional” life. So, once again, you are completely missing the point. If Adam would have fulfilled the law, he would have earned “eternal life.” That is the logical implication from the totality of Scriptural revelation.
This same sort of “reasoning” can be applied (and destroys) your own argument:
“Do not this and live” cannot be implied from the command in Genesis alone, for God did not decree for Adam to “do not this” (i.e., obey). You are simply supplying “additional premises…into a hypothetical situation that has no logical ground in reality–which is to say that it is trying to guess what God would do if God were not the God who has done. How could God do differently than He wills [i.e., grant Adam continuing life] unless He was a different God, unless you wish to separate God’s willing from His character?”
Fortunately, for the sake of systematic theology, your “reasoning” is faulty.
Roger Mann said,
May 7, 2008 at 3:00 pm
66: Jeff wrote,
Well, John Gill does quite a nice job of “reconciling” those three premises in his commentary on 1 Thessalonians 4:3.
David Gadbois said,
May 7, 2008 at 4:42 pm
Where is the suggestion of indifference or justification for inferring it? God certainly has a reason for commanding what he commands. The errant assumption on your part is that he desires (in some sense which always remains undefined ) that it be obeyed
Well, it seems fairly natural to infer that God is indifferent to his preceptive commands if he does not “desire” it. You only have 3 logical options here: either God desired it (positive), was indifferent to it (neutral), or that He desired that his precepts would NOT be done (negative). I assumed the third option was out of the question, so we are stuck choosing between the first two.
in those instances when it is disobeyed it is exactly what he intended and that for his own good purpose
I agree with that completely. So be baffled no longer.
God wills one thing in one sense and wills its antithesis in another sense and such a thing makes perfect sense.
As Piper points out in his article, there is nothing uncommon about that. We all have priorities, and things that we desire more than other things. We, even as humans, try and affect things according to our greater desires, even if our lesser desires must be sacrificed.
One can read Turretin and understand what he means given the language he uses if one takes into account all that he says
This response is just hand-waving. I agree with everything Turretin wrote on that account, but he never says anything that supports your thesis (that the preceptive will does not include desire or intentionality).
“The will of God is one and most simple.” Uh…except when it isn’t.
Turretin also said “Hence have arisen various distinctions of the will of God” right after that. You are oversimplifying.
But that you think someone suggested an absence of intention explains a good deal and doesn’t bode well for this exchange.
Well, you are the one trying to take the “will” out of the “preceptive will.” To will something is to have intent (and therefore intention). These ideas, indeed, are what the NT’s Θελημα mean.
Ron DiGiacomo said,
May 7, 2008 at 4:51 pm
Nicely done, Joshua. Because the word “will” is used in the term “preceptive will” people often argue as if it is a given that God must desire his precepts to be carried out in all circumstances. After all, it’s his preceptive *will*, is it not? You see the problem, hence your desire to improve upon equivocal language. This matter is not unlike the discussions over “free will.” We know all men have a “will.” We might define the will as the faculty of choice or that by which the mind chooses. Now would someone tell me what’s free about it? And while they’re at it, maybe someone will tell me why God’s commands are best thought of as his preceptive will since he doesn’t will / desire that men always obey them.
Cheers,
Ron
its.reed said,
May 7, 2008 at 5:00 pm
Mark C:
I understand that the conversation is a little intense at this point. I recognize that you and David Gadbois are making strong assertions in opposition to one another.
I observe what appears to be a hint of flippancy in your last post here (#65). You most likely mean nothing by it. Please, if you would, take care to not simply respond in a flippant manner. Pointed comments that are substantive are always appropriate. Pointed comments that just dig at another are never helpful.
P.S. consider this a gentle reminder all :?
Thanks for understanding.
Ron DiGiacomo said,
May 7, 2008 at 5:02 pm
(2) the certainty that what God’s will comes to pass, and
(3) a clear expression in 1 Thess. 4.3 that God has willed something (that His people abstain from sexual immorality) that has clearly not come to pass.
Jeff,
If it is true that God’s will certainly comes to pass, then it must be false that people disobeyed his will. Accordingly, your #1 contradicts your #2. The reason you find no contradiction in the two premises is because you in your mind have changed the meaning of will, which is the equivocation that Mark and Joshua are frustrated with. You are consistent in your theology yet your *literal* expression of what you believe is contradictory. You’re using “will” in two different senses, aren’t you?
Ron
Ron DiGiacomo said,
May 7, 2008 at 6:21 pm
“Therein lies the difference between my predestinarian schema that allows for man’s will to choose whatever is in his character to choose (and since Adam was innocent, he had it in his character to choose the right), versus the Arminian scheme, which says that man always has the power of contrary choice.”
Lane, when you say that man can choose “whatever” is in his character, are you suggesting that man can choose with equal ease x and ~x if it is consistent with his nature to choose either? It seems from your quote above that you could be suggesting that necessity of choice only pertains to choosing consistently with one’s nature (e.g., whether regenerate or fallen), as opposed to pertaining to the strongest inclination at the moment of choice, which of course is always consistent with the overall nature of the agent. You seem to be granting the power of contrary choice by allowing men to choose whatever is consistent with their nature. You seem to do this on another post as well when you attribute a self-generating impetus of choice to Adam’s prelapsarian make-up.
Thanks,
Ron
Jeff Cagle said,
May 7, 2008 at 6:26 pm
Ron (#72):
You’re using “will” in two different senses, aren’t you?
Yes, that’s certainly one piece of the puzzle: that “will” in (2) and “will” in (3) are equivocating. So the standard way of expressing this is that God has a “decretive will” (as in (2)) and a “preceptive will” (as in (3)).
And I basically agree with that framework.
But it still baffles me when I think more carefully on it. Disambiguating the term “will” is a start, but it now raises more questions:
* What is the relationship between God’s decretive will and His preceptive will?
* Does He desire both in different senses, OR does He desire one but not the other?
The solution that you point to in #70 is to say that God desires His decretal will but not (always) His preceptive will. Therefore, you applaud Joshua for disambiguating “will.” He insists that the term apply only to God’s decrees, reserving the term “command” for His precepts.
OK. That resolves (1) – (3) by saying that God does not actually “desire” his preceptive will to be accomplished. It’s logically consistent, affirms God’s sovereignty, and seems to be a clean solution.
But this raises two further problems:
* Exegetical: Why then does 1 Thess. 4.3 identify God’s command as his “desire” or “will”? Ditto with Ezek. 18.23 — God clearly states that he desires the wicked man to repent. On your account, it seems, God does not desire what He says He desires. Or on Joshua’s account, God’s precepts are to be called His “commands” but not His “will” — except that 1 Thess. 4.3 is breaking his rule!
* Theological: What does it mean then to say that God commands things that He actually wants to *not* happen?
Take the case of Alice and Bob. Alice is married to Charlie, but she is thrown together at work with Bob and becomes strongly attracted to him. She mentions this to her pastor and wonders whether marrying Charlie was a mistake. She wants to know what God’s desire for her is.
The poor innocent pastor says, “God’s desire is for you to honor your marriage vows and abstain from sexual immorality”, appealing to 1 Thess 4.3.
But Alice fails to resist temptation, and she ends up fantasizing about Bob on a regular basis.
(I’m not fixated on sex normally — it’s just that 1 Thess. 4.3 seems like such a clear example here…)
Now: at this point, can Alice legitimately say that what God wants was for her to sin? If she ends up leaving Bob, can she legitimately tell him that this is what God wants?
Of course not. And so the theological problem can be summarized succinctly: if God does not actually desire that we obey His commands, then the argument “let us do evil so that God’s will is accomplished” actually makes sense.
Or take another passage:
Do not conform any longer to the pattern of this world, but be transformed by the renewing of your mind. Then you will be able to test and approve what God’s will is—his good, pleasing and perfect will. — Rom. 12.2
In what sense does the renewing of our minds enable us to test and approve the decrees of God? Does it not rather enable us to test and approve the precepts of God?
Or again, why does the Lord tell us to pray that our Father’s will be done, if all that He means is that we’re asking God to accomplish His decrees?!
So while it makes sense to disambiguate “decretal will” from “preceptive will”, I don’t think the Scriptures allow us to say that God’s commands do not reflect His desire. I recognize that my scruple here doesn’t allow me to join in Joshua’s solution, but the Scriptures seem to require it.
Regards,
Jeff Cagle
Jeff Cagle said,
May 7, 2008 at 6:28 pm
apparently, . ) makes a smiley too.
.)
Ron DiGiacomo said,
May 7, 2008 at 8:21 pm
Jeff, I don’t know how much time I’m going to be able to spend on this but let me try to answer your concerns as best I can.
To my statement “You’re using “will” in two different senses, aren’t you?” You wrote:
“Yes, that’s certainly one piece of the puzzle: that “will” in (2) and “will” in (3) are equivocating. So the standard way of expressing this is that God has a “decretive will” (as in (2)) and a “preceptive will” (as in (3)). And I basically agree with that framework.”
If one uses “will” in two different ways, then it’s equivocal and, therefore, not helpful. However, after reading your post back to me, it’s apparent that you are not intending to use “will” in two different ways. It sincerely pains me to say this, but please disregard my earlier remark about your theology being consistent. I obviously misread your meaning.
The modifiers of “decretive” and “preceptive” do not change the meaning of the word “will” for you. In both cases, the word “will” (for you) refers to what God wants to occur. So, in the case of his decretive will, it’s the decree God wants to bring to pass. And in the case of preceptive will, the term refers to the precepts God wants to be carried out (by others) – hence the contradiction since his precepts he often times does not want obeyed.
“But it still baffles me when I think more carefully on it.”
I think it must baffle you or anyone else who would hold to contradictory propositions. Please walk with me for a moment more.
“* What is the relationship between God’s decretive will and His preceptive will?”
The only relationship I find is that it was God’s decretive will that many Calvinists would hold to the Arminian notion of God having a preceptive will (rather than just precepts that men are to obey). The solution is to be found in abandoning the latter notion – and not in trying to reconcile the irreconcilable.
With respect to 1 Thess. 4:3, off the top of my head I’d have to say that God’s desire is that His elect would repent from immorality, which of course they eventually will being elect. Similarly, the Ezekiel passage presents no problem at all. God is comparing two possible outcomes atomistically, apart from any intricate plan wherein particulars impinge upon particulars. Given the two particulars (life and death) taken in isolation apart from his overall plan, he certainly prefers life over death – but only as an overall ideal. To press this passage so to make it mean that God desires within his decree that which he doesn’t desire within his decree is to suggest we may hold to contradictory propositions. Stick with me, the punch line is yet to come.
“Theological: What does it mean then to say that God commands things that He actually wants to *not* happen?”
Does that violate the law of contradiction?
“can Alice legitimately say that what God wants was for her to sin? If she ends up leaving Bob, can she legitimately tell him that this is what God wants?”
In the instance that she would have sinned, yes, she would be theologically correct in saying that God wanted her to sin. Yet that would not be the whole story, now would it? There’s a built in theological lapse in such a fatalistic excuse, which I must believe you recognize. That being, she would have been responsible do that which God commanded of her, whether he desired to grant her the ability to do it or not! (Notice I said whether he granted her the ability to do it or not; as opposed to saying “whether she desired to do it or not.” (****More on that later****.)
Another point you might be overlooking is that what God wants to come to pass is not always germane to what we are responsible to do before God. Secondly, if one is a believer, God will sanctify him; so in the case of Alice, as she is treated according to her profession, we may say that “God wants you to get victory over that sin that is characteristic of reprobates and not true believers.” If she doesn’t turn, then we would have been wrong that God wanted her to turn. Notwithstanding, we would have been correct in treating her according to what she said she was, a believer in Christ.
****Here’s the rub****:
Let me take this in a somewhat different direction. I trust you believe that repentance is a gift of God. Accordingly, if Alice was to repent, then God would have needed to grant Alice’s repentance effectually – yes? Yet God chose – according to his greatest desire at the moment of Alice’s choice – not to grant Alice repentance. It was God’s desire to withhold repentance if she did not repent, wasn’t it? If it was God’s desire that he not grant her repentance – and if it is true that Alice cannot possibly repent on her own – then what would it mean to say that God desired that Alice repent (on her own)? Does God desire impossibilities? When God desires that one repent, he causes that person to repent. The person does the repenting, but only because God desires to grant repentance – which is to say, only because God desires to see repentance occur. Accordingly, to say that God wants Alice to repent when Alice does not end up repenting is to say that God desires and does not desire to grant repentance to the same person at the same time, which is the essence of contradiction. The same goes with salvation. Too many Calvinists think that God desires reprobates to turn. Well, does he? Does God desire to regenerate men who he refuses according to his own desire not to regenerate? It has nothing to do with God desiring dead men to turn and live. But it has everything to do with whether God desires to raise the dead that he has no intention to raise.
Jeff, if you don’t interact with that particular portion, I’ll probably pass on any more interactions. Please understand that I’ve spent too much time on the internet w/ brothers in Christ who don’t offer anything that resembles an internal critique of my position, yet instead they simply re-assert their own position, just in different words. Thanks for understanding.
“And so the theological problem can be summarized succinctly: if God does not actually desire that we obey His commands, then the argument “let us do evil so that God’s will is accomplished” actually makes sense.”
You may equally say, do “good” so that God’s will is accomplished. Your statement has greater shock value of course, but what premises do you wish to tag onto that one and to what final conclusion do you wish to arrive?
Yours,
Ron
Jeff Cagle said,
May 7, 2008 at 9:27 pm
Hi Ron,
Thanks for your time on this. I must say, you’ve fairly presented a robust critique of the “preceptive will” position. So I’ll do my best to respond in kind, with no expectations on your future time.
First, the terms “preceptive will” and “decretive will” are intended to be disambiguations. “Preceptive will” is intended to be a synonym for the moral obligations God has revealed to us. “Decretive will” is intended to mean what God has decreed to happen.
In that sense, and to that extent, I think we all agree that there is no necessary contradiction so far.
But the contradiction is introduced by the next claim:
D: God actually desires that His preceptive will be carried out.
Your argument against D is based on an appeal to non-contradiction, which I respect. My argument for D is based on an appeal to the plain text of Scripture. So that’s where we stand at the moment.
With respect to 1 Thess. 4:3, off the top of my head I’d have to say that God’s desire is that His elect would repent from immorality, which of course they eventually will being elect.
I think this identifies another element in the solution: that in the eschaton, God’s “preceptive will” will actually be consummated in God’s decrees.
But in the in-between time, God’s “preceptive will” as defined above has not yet been consummated. And this is the time and situation in which Paul is writing to the Thessalonians.
On your account of God’s will, then, Paul must mean something like “God has decreed that you will be sanctified, that you will abstain from sexual immorality in the eschaton.”
And yet his followup is,
Several features here are entirely inconsistent with a decretive, eschatological reading of 1 Thess 4.3ff:
* The second clause “that you would learn” is an additional part of God’s desire; yet, in the eschaton, we will have no need to learn anything.
* There will be no sexual immorality for you to abstain from in the eschaton. Paul’s intent is clearly directed towards the present.
* Paul identifies this “will” as an “instruction” — a command to be obeyed.
So while this is not your requested internal critique of the position, it is still a significant Scriptural objection to your position: in at least one passage, God’s will is identified with a command for the present which will clearly not be obeyed in all cases.
Some points of agreement:
…what God wants to come to pass is not always germane to what we are responsible to do before God.
Agreed. We are responsible for who we are and what we do as a result of who we are. Pharoah and Judas were judged despite fulfilling God’s (decretal) will in their lives.
I trust you believe that repentance is a gift of God.
Yes.
Now to the rub:
Accordingly, to say that God wants Alice to repent when Alice does not end up repenting is to say that God desires and does not desire to grant repentance to the same person at the same time, which is the essence of contradiction.
Unless God desires repentance in one sense, but does not desire it in another sense. In which case, the contradiction disappears.
But now in what senses? And this is where I profess ignorance. Possibilities:
(1) God has a complex will — which would challenge our notions of simplicity.
(2) God has desires that can be prioritized (this was the Piper solution), which is a special case of (1), or
(3) The desiring associated with ethical norms is a different type of desire altogether from the desiring associated with decrees, but both desires are expressed in the same language in Scripture. In this case, God has a simple will, but He also has other non-will desires. The objection to this is that God might then be “frustrated.”
(4) God’s desires in the Now-Not-Yet time in which we live are presented to us in a complex fashion because His decrees have not yet reached their fulfillment, and we cannot comprehend time in his way, or
(5) Other.
Finally, you ask
JRC:
What does it mean then to say that God commands things that He actually wants to *not* happen?
RDG:
Does that violate the law of contradiction?
If not, it comes very close. But I think it does, as follows:
If God commands something that He does not desire in any sense to occur, then His word expresses our ethical obligation. To obey His word (if it were possible!) would then be a violation of God’s desires — which amounts to a failure to love God. We then would sin by obeying God, which is nonsensical.
So yes, I think there is a serious problem with stipulating that God can command something that He does not desire in any sense at all that we actually do.
Grace and peace,
Jeff Cagle
Ron DiGiacomo said,
May 7, 2008 at 11:23 pm
Jeff,
I think you might have skipped over my post, though I do appreciate you quoting me as much as you did. Don’t worry about it though… I’m really getting used to it. :-)
In the final analyses, I believe you have failed to deal with the problem that begins and ends with God being the only one who can grant repentance. If God truly desires Judas’ repentance, then God must desire to instantiate a state of affairs that includes Judas’ repentance. Otherwise, what is it to desire repentance over non-repentance without a willingness to bring it to pass? Moreover, any state of affairs that would include Judas’ repentance would have to include God’s effectuation of that repentance since God’s effectuation of repentance is a necessary condition for repentance. And any state of affairs that would include God’s effectuation of Judas’ repentance would also have to include God’s desire to effectuate that repentance since God never acts without a desire to do so. Therefore, any desire God would have for Judas repentance must be accompanied by a desire to instantiate a state of affairs in which God desires to effectuate Judas’ repentance, which would result necessarily in Judas’ repentance. So, if Judas doesn’t repent, then God must not desire for repentance to occur.
In an effort to get around all this, you have posited that God can desire in “another sense” that Judas repent. Well, in what “sense” do you suppose this can be? Please give me just one example of what this “sense” can be? Does God desire that Judas grant himself repentance? Is that the other sense of which you speak? Saying “in one sense” but “not in another sense” is often convenient but rarely useful. To say that God has a priority of desires, also, gets you nowhere. Are we going to say that God truly desires to regenerate someone but he doesn’t do so because he prefers to damn them for his own glory? If so, then what does it mean that he desires them to turn?! Certainly the Holy Spirit is not tempted with desire to turn one for whom Christ did not die. Again, flesh these desires of priority out for me a bit more. In what sense does God desire to act contrary to his decree after all? Did God decree that he’d have a desire to act contrary to his decree, but that the desire to do so would be a lesser desire?
As I argue here: http://reformedapologist.blogspot.com/2006/09/does-god-desire-salvation-of-all.html Is it reasonable to think that the Holy Spirit desires to turn the reprobate toward himself when the Father did not choose the reprobate in Christ? Moreover, Christ did not die for the reprobate, let alone does he pray that the efficacy of the cross would be applied to the reprobate. Consequently, it is not available for the Holy Spirit to unite the reprobate to the finished work of Christ! Does God desire what is not available to Him? Does God desire that the Godhead work at cross purposes? Does God desire contradictions after all?
It’s one thing to say that God has a priority of opposing desires. It’s quite another thing to say God desires what He simply cannot do due to His previous actions in time. This polemic is not merely that God cannot act contrary to His decree. The weight of the argument is that God cannot act contrary to what he has actually done in Christ. In a word, not only can God not save the reprobate. 2000 years ago He acted in time sealing that inability. For God to desire the salvation of the reprobate is to say that God – today – desires that Jesus would have died for the reprobate 2000 years ago. What can God desire on this regard other than the past be different? Is God really that much like us?
Ron
Jeff Cagle said,
May 8, 2008 at 9:42 am
Ron (#78):
We may have hit the point of impasse. Certainly, it has not been my desire to skip over your post — quite the contrary, I’ve ruminated on it for some time yesterday.
To summarize where we stand:
* I cannot offer a full account of the “senses” that distinguish God’s preceptive will from his decretal will, except by referring to their respective spheres: moral and historical, respectively. So while you might request such, I can’t produce. Sorry. That fact bothers me at least as much as it bothers you.
* However, I am unwilling to adopt your solution — that God does not in any sense desire what He commands (except when His commands happen to coincide with His decrees). Your solution, while logically clean and free from apparent internal contradictions, nevertheless apparently contradicts the plain text of Scripture.
And not in 1 Thess. 4.3 only, but in multiple places, God expresses His precepts as desires:
Ps. 40.6, 8; Ps. 51.6; Hos. 6.6; Matt. 9.13, 12.7; Rom 8.5; Gal. 5.17 — all of these associate the desires of God with the following of His precepts, even in contexts where it is clear that His precepts have not been followed:
I desire to do your will, O my God; your law is within my heart. — here, David explicitly identifies God’s “will” with his “law.”
Surely you desire truth in the inner parts; you teach me wisdom in the inmost place. — David says this even as he repents of his sin with Bathsheba.
For I desire mercy, not sacrifice, and acknowledgment of God rather than burnt offerings. — God says this to the Israelites as a way of criticizing their current practices. He wants their mercy, but He gets their sacrifices.
So in what “sense” do I mean that God desires His preceptive will to be followed? In the same sense that David, Hosea, and Paul mean it — whatever sense that is.
Finally, you ask, In what sense does God desire to act contrary to his decree after all?
It’s a fair question. Even though I haven’t accepted your argument, it’s not because I’m immune to the appeal. But now, the other shoe:
In what sense does God command us to do things that He desires for us not to do?
I think this is the major difficulty for your position, and you’ll need to address it in order to mount a successful attack on “preceptive will.” You will need to address the passages that identify God’s precepts with His will. You will need to show how your position does not make God the author of sin. And you will need to show how your position allows us to understand God’s will, if not in terms of His precepts.
In short: yes, my position has internal tensions that I don’t know how to resolve. And, assuming (safely!) that your position includes the truth of Scripture, yours does too: the denial of “prescriptive will” amounts to denying that when God says He “desires” truth in the inmost parts, He doesn’t actually. That when God says He “wills” our present sanctification, He doesn’t actually desire it. Those contradictions are every bit as problematic as affirming that God desires things that He does not decree.
And that’s where we are. It may or may not be the case that we can move further along, so I will understand if you choose to not to engage further.
Grace and peace,
Jeff Cagle
MarkC said,
May 8, 2008 at 10:33 am
David,
This will be my last post on the matter.
Well, it seems fairly natural to infer that God is indifferent to his preceptive commands if he does not “desire” it. You only have 3 logical options here:
You’re begging the question David for you assume that “desire” is a desire that the command be obeyed. But God is eternally omniscient and has decreed all that comes to pass from eternity. This leaves only one logically sound option David, and that is that God wills, desires, intends, wants, determines, and that from eternity, that his precepts not be obeyed in may instances. And in those instances where he does will that it be obeyed he himself is the enabler. This leaves you with a logically irreconcilable contradiction which you attempt to remove by the introduction of equivocation. God wills, you suggest, in two different senses always leaving the one sense undefined other than to just insist that there is some sense in which God wills that which does not come to pass. A contradiction that is, quite frankly, patently absurd. What is it, after all, for an eternally omniscient God to have competing desires and unrealized volitions? Does he choose, weighing options (a novel concept to introduce into an eternally omniscient mind) between competing desires willing the one most preferable? Does he want what he can’t have? Does he do what he does not intend? What happens exactly when God wills that which does not come to pass? Define that will for me and David and tell me what is accomplished by it.
God is not confused. Remove the equivocation, understand that a precept is a command and the contradictions are eliminated. God can command men to repent and will that they not repent without contradiction. For the intent underlying the command might be any number of non-contradictory things such as (as has already been stated) showing sin to be utterly sinful or demonstrating the depravity of mankind. He neither desires nor wills that the command be obeyed for the demonstration requires disobedience and that is what is willed (decreed).
So what do we have by way of review? Your first option is a petitio. Your second (indifference) is incoherent for nothing exists (in this case the command) that God did not intend. He intended to command men (and did so) though he did not intend that the command be obeyed apart from his gracious enablement. The third option which you say is out of the question is the only correct one. Three strikes David.
I agree with that completely. So be baffled no longer.
What is baffling is the way contradiction rests comfortably in your mind.
As Piper points out in his article, there is nothing uncommon about that. We all have priorities, and things that we desire more than other things. We, even as humans, try and affect things according to our greater desires, even if our lesser desires must be sacrificed.
“We all”? And that all includes God? Can you spell anthropocentricsm? Let me direct you to the last question in Ron’s post #78 and let me help you out a bit. We are the image of God, he is not the image of man.
This response is just hand-waving. I agree with everything Turretin wrote on that account, but he never says anything that supports your thesis (that the preceptive will does not include desire or intentionality).
I’m sorry David but he doesn’t suggest that the perceptive will includes intent if by intent you mean that the precept be obeyed. Let me walk you through the whole passage.
“The will of God is one and most simple.”
That statement, whether you know it or not, is definitive.
Turretin also said “Hence have arisen various distinctions of the will of God” right after that. You are oversimplifying.
Actually it is you who are doing so by isolating sections that are not to be understood apart from the whole. It is unfortunate that Turretin equivocates, nevertheless he does make his meaning clear in spite of it. Here is the entire section.
“Hence have arisen various distinctions of the will of God. The first and principal distinction is that of the decretive and preceptive will. The former means that which God wills to do, or permits himself; the latter what he wills that we should do…the former cannot be resisted and is always fulfilled (Rom. 9:19)…the latter is often violated by men (Mt. 23:27)” ibid p 220
If that was all we had from Turretin we might be left disagreeing over what he actually meant. But to posit that Turretin meant that the precept is what God wills that we do (instead of what we should do as Turretin is careful to state) is to introduce a contradiction. Turretin is clear that the decree (that which God wills to do) cannot be resisted and is always fulfilled. The precept (the command) can and is violated. It cannot therefore be that he means to say that God wills that men obey for he is clear that the will of God (that which he effects) cannot be resisted. This is most obvious as he continues.
“The will of decree may be that which determines the events of things, but the will of precept that which prescribes man his duty. Therefore God can (without contradiction) will as to precept what he does not will as to decree inasmuch as he wills to prescribe something to man, but does not will to effect it (as he willed Pharaoh to release the people, but yet nilled their actual release.) ibid p 221
Here Turretin is more meticulous. The decree is God’s will and is determinative. The precept (the command) is not determinative but prescriptive. It is a requirement placed on man by God. Now please pay close attention to the Turretin’s concluding “therefore” for it contains no suggestion of competing desires or contradictions in the will of God. He makes it perfectly clear exactly what has been willed. God willed to prescribe (which is just to say he gave a command) what is not necessarily willed in the decree (that which is effected) without contradiction because a desire for obedience is not a constitutive component of the command. So the following rewording of Turretin better expresses the meaning that Turretin wished to convey.
“The will of decree may be that which determines the events of things, but the command that which prescribes man his duty. Therefore God can (without contradiction) command what he does not will as to decree inasmuch as he wills to prescribe something to man, [i.e. he commands] but does not will to effect it (as he commanded Pharaoh to release the people, but yet [did not] will their actual release.)
To confuse will with precept is an error of category. There are not two wills in God as you and our confused Baptist friend Piper suggests, but rather one. Or as Turretin rightly said ““The will of God is one and most simple.”
I’m through and the last word is yours.
Ron DiGiacomo said,
May 8, 2008 at 10:48 am
Brother Jeff,
I rejoice that we cling to a common Savior!
Yours in Christ,
Ron
Roger Mann said,
May 8, 2008 at 11:12 am
78: Ron wrote,
Quite true, and great point! Moreover, the notion of a “priority of opposing desires” in God is a red herring and completely irrelevant to the discussion even when applied to the very first command given to Adam. Even if we accept these supposed “opposing desires” in God for the sake of argument, at the “point” of the divine decree that Adam would disobey God’s command (which was in eternity past) and then at the point at which God gave Adam the command (at the beginning of human history), the stronger desire that Adam disobey the command had already overridden the weaker desire that he obey the command, so that neither the divine decree nor the issuing of the command in time can any longer express or allow for any genuine “desire” in God that Adam obey the command. In other words, even if God’s desires are in opposition to one another (which I reject), the decree and the command are not in opposition to one another — and the decree and the command are precisely what we are supposed to be talking about here.
MarkC said,
May 8, 2008 at 11:17 am
Roger you are a breath of fresh logical air.
Roger Mann said,
May 8, 2008 at 11:34 am
80: MarkC (rewording Turretin) wrote,
Mark, excellent post! God in no sense “wanted,” “desired,” or “intended” for Pharaoh to obey His command, for God Himself “hardened” Pharaoh’s heart “so that he would not let the people go” (Exodus 4:21). So much for the (false) notion that God must always have a “desire” or “intention” that His commands be obeyed!
Joshua said,
May 8, 2008 at 3:59 pm
#67 Roger wrote:
If all we had to work with was “the command in Genesis alone,” you might have a valid point. But we have further revelation which clearly reveals that God’s promise of life in His law is “eternal life” (the same “eternal life” that Jesus earned by fulfilling the law) not merely perpetual “conditional” life. So, once again, you are completely missing the point. If Adam would have fulfilled the law, he would have earned “eternal life.” That is the logical implication from the totality of Scriptural revelation.
My reply:
The point I have tried to make several times now is that you cannot use premises from the Covenant of Grace that is made with Christ in reconstructing a hypothetical world in which Adam fulfilled the Covenant of Works. I’m not missing the point. I’m rejecting the point because it is a matter of speculation rather than of logical necessity. Is it possible that Adam’s obedience would have merited eternal life? It is as possible as pigs flying had Adam obeyed. What is logically necessary is only what flows from a known state of affairs, not a hypothetical. What is known in the Covenant of Works with Adam prior to his fall into sin is the bare command “do this and die” and it bare logical opposite, “do this an live.”
Roger quotes me:
Everything else requires additional premises to be brought into a hypothetical situation that has no logical ground in reality–which is to say that it is trying to guess what God would do if God were not the God who has done. How could God do differently than He wills unless He was a different God, unless you wish to separate God’s willing from His character?
Then Roger says:
This same sort of “reasoning” can be applied (and destroys) your own argument:
“Do not this and live” cannot be implied from the command in Genesis alone, for God did not decree for Adam to “do not this” (i.e., obey). You are simply supplying “additional premises…into a hypothetical situation that has no logical ground in reality–which is to say that it is trying to guess what God would do if God were not the God who has done. How could God do differently than He wills [i.e., grant Adam continuing life] unless He was a different God, unless you wish to separate God’s willing from His character?”
Fortunately, for the sake of systematic theology, your “reasoning” is faulty.
My reply:
You seem to misunderstand the nature of the laws of logic (identity, contradiction, and excluded middle) when applied to conditional statements. For any conditional statement, its opposite must be implied if the law of contradiction is to exist at all. Thus the conditional command, “If you eat poison, then you will die” of necessity implies its opposite, “If you do not eat poison, then you will live.” By asserting that God’s command “Do this and you will die” implies its opposite “do not this and you will live,” I am not importing an additional premise, but merely revealing the logical opposite of the known premise that is required according to the law of contradiction.
What you assume, which I refuse to assume, is the necessity that Adam’s obedience would merit eternal life. You can only arrive at that conclusion by speculating that the Covenant of Grace is identical to the Covenant of Works in what it promises.
More than this, and the crucial point, is that Adam was ontologically mutable. There are two ways he could have been given eternal life: 1) He could be remade so that his nature was immutably righteous, which would require that he be united to God in the same way in which we are united to God in Christ; 2) God would have had to arrange circumstances such that Adam’s mutable nature never encountered temptation that was more than he could bear.
Again, you may speculate as to whether or not Adam would have received either of these two results, but you engage in a logical fallacy when you assert that he must necessarily receive such for his obedience. Logical necessity does not extend to hypothetical, for what is proposed is not actual, and therefore unknown.
Roger Mann said,
May 9, 2008 at 11:41 am
85: Joshua wrote,
Joshua, the “point” you have tried to make several times now is completely irrelevant to the issue; repeating it over and over again doesn’t somehow make it relevant. The truth is, the same moral law that applied to Adam under the Covenant of Works also applied to Jesus under the Covenant of Grace, and this same moral law threatens “eternal death” for the breach of it and “eternal life” upon the fulfilling of it. Therefore, Adam would have merited “eternal life” if (hypothetically) he had fulfilled the requirements of God’s law, just as Jesus merited “eternal life” when He actually fulfilled the requirements of God’s law. The integrity of God’s law and promise demands such a conclusion. Your refusal to acknowledge this valid logical deduction is quite puzzling indeed.
No, I understand how the laws of logic apply to conditional statements quite well. I was simply pointing out that if your criticism of my argument were valid (and it’s not), then it would apply equally to your own argument, since we are both using “conditional” propositions in our arguments that necessarily imply their opposites. Moreover, since neither of our arguments are actually “importing additional premises,” I was simply redirecting your own false accusation against my argument back upon your own. I was using absurdity to demonstrate the absurd.
What you have actually done is to leave out a crucial piece of biblical data from the premise in your argument. Your argument, “Do this and you will die” implies its opposite “do not this and you will live” is valid, but it is based upon a partial truth and is therefore incorrect and unscriptural. The totality of biblical revelation clearly teaches that the “death” threatened in Genesis 3 is eternal death. Therefore, the correct construction of the argument should be, “Do this and you will incur eternal death” implies its opposite “do not this and you will acquire eternal life.” This is the “logical opposite of the known [biblical] premise that is required according to the law of contradiction.” And it supports the Biblical and Reformed doctrine of the Covenant of Works, not the deformed version you are trying to pass off.
It’s not speculation at all. As I pointed out above, the same moral law that applied to Adam under the Covenant of Works also applied to Jesus under the Covenant of Grace, and this same moral law threatens “eternal death” for the breach of it and “eternal life” upon the fulfilling of it. The law explicitly states, “The man who does those things shall live by them” (Romans 10:5), and Jesus Himself confirms that the life promised in the law is “eternal life” (Matthew 19:16-17). This is the explicit teaching of Scripture, not wild “speculation” about some unrevealed connection between the two Adams in their respective federal headships.
I fail to see how this is “the crucial point” in any sense at all. We are dealing with a “hypothetical” premise here (that Adam fulfilled the requirements of God’s law), and there is nothing illogical in drawing a valid conclusion using a hypothetical premise. The fact that Adam was “ontologically mutable” is irrelevant to the argument.
RBerman said,
May 9, 2008 at 1:57 pm
Re #85 Joshua:
You seem to misunderstand the nature of the laws of logic (identity, contradiction, and excluded middle) when applied to conditional statements. For any conditional statement, its opposite must be implied if the law of contradiction is to exist at all. Thus the conditional command, “If you eat poison, then you will die” of necessity implies its opposite, “If you do not eat poison, then you will live.”
The inverse of a statement is not necessarily true. “If you eat, you will die” does not imply “If you do not eat, you will not die.” Rather, the contrapositive of a statement is necessarily true. “If you eat, you will die” necessarily implies “If it’s not the case that you will die, then it’s not the case that you have eaten.”
That said, I do believe that God’s explicit, “If you eat, you will die” did imply, “If you do not eat, you will live.” But that’s not a matter of the laws of logic (as you claimed), but of the commonplace conventions of ordinary speech.
Joshua said,
May 9, 2008 at 5:00 pm
Roger,
The moral law requires a knowledge of good and evil does it not? Yet Adam, in his innocence, possessed no such knowledge. What Adam knew was what God revealed to Him, which was the simple command.
To assume that the full import of the moral law is contained in the command to Adam is not logically warranted.
Also, Adam’s ontological nature does indeed having bearing in the argument. Adam’s moral ability is an aspect of his created nature.
Finally, let us remember that whatever hypothetical you wish to offer requires you to also posit a hypothetical decree that is different from what God has decreed, for the decrees precede whatever occurs in your hypothetical garden.
What we know that God has decreed is that Christ is the true image of God in human flesh and that Adam was simply a type, i.e. an incomplete production of what was yet to come. The image of God in mutable Adam is fulfilled in the immutable Christ as the perfect image of God.
While you may think you are dealing with the whole of Scripture, you are actually extending beyond what it warrants. You simply assume more than is there to assume.
I don’t expect you to agree, though I hope you will see what is the case.
At any rate, rather than continue, I give you the last word and leave you with my own affirmation of our agreement that whatever may be true of Adam, his hypothetical obedience would have been the result of the grace of God and not by some autonomous power within himself.
Joshua said,
May 9, 2008 at 5:08 pm
# 87 Berman said:
The inverse of a statement is not necessarily true. “If you eat, you will die” does not imply “If you do not eat, you will not die.” Rather, the contrapositive of a statement is necessarily true. “If you eat, you will die” necessarily implies “If it’s not the case that you will die, then it’s not the case that you have eaten.”
That said, I do believe that God’s explicit, “If you eat, you will die” did imply, “If you do not eat, you will live.” But that’s not a matter of the laws of logic (as you claimed), but of the commonplace conventions of ordinary speech.
The contrapositive form of the proposition is simply an alternative way of stating the same meaning expressed in the “commonplace convention”–”If you do not eat, you will live,” but you invite a further comment that is important.
Namely, the blessing of God precedes the stipulation of the covenant. Adam is blessed with life in the Garden and fellowship with God prior to God’s command to him to “not eat.” This is also true of the subsequent manifestations of the CoG, e.g. Israel is brought out of bondage in Egypt prior to God’s delivery of the Law to Moses at Sinai. The Mosaic Law was God’s command to Israel of how they were to continue in the covenant that He initiated in bringing them out of Egypt. Grace precedes command and secures obedience according to God’s good pleasure.
rgmann said,
May 9, 2008 at 8:10 pm
88: Joshua wrote,
Adam knew the content of the moral law in the same way that all men who don’t possess the written law know about it — God has “written the law in their hearts” (Romans 2:14-15). Robert Shaw explains:
The law, as thus inscribed on the heart of the first man, is often styled the law of creation, because it was the will of the sovereign Creator, revealed to the reasonable creature, by impressing it upon his mind and heart at his creation. It is also called the moral law, because it was a revelation of the will of God, as his moral governor, and was the standard and rule of man’s moral actions. Adam was originally placed under this law in its natural form, as merely directing and obliging him to perfect obedience. He was brought under it in a covenant form, when an express threatening of death, and a gracious promise of life, was annexed to it; and then a positive precept was added, enjoining him not to eat of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, as the test of his obedience to the whole law.—Gen. ii. 16, 17. That this covenant was made with the first man, not as a single person, but as the federal representative of all his natural posterity, has been formerly shown. The law, as invested with a covenant form, is called, by the Apostle Paul, “The law of works” (Rom. iii. 27); that is, the law as a covenant of works. In this form, the law is to be viewed as not only prescribing duty, but as promising life as the reward of obedience, and denouncing death as the punishment of transgression. This law “which was ordained to life,” is now become “weak through the flesh,” or through the corruption of our fallen nature. It prescribes terms which we are incapable of performing; and instead of being encouraged to seek life by our own obedience to the law as a covenant, we are required to renounce all hopes of salvation in that way, and to seek it by faith in Christ. But all men are naturally under the law as a broken covenant, obnoxious to its penalty, and bound to yield obedience to its commands. The covenant being made with Adam, not only for himself, but also for all his posterity, when he violated it, he left them all under it as a broken covenant. Most miserable, therefore is the condition of all men by nature; for “as many as are of the works of the law are under the curse.”—Gal. iii. 10. Truly infatuated are they who seek for righteousness by the works of the law; for “by the deeds of the law shall no flesh be justified in the sight of God.”—Rom. iii. 20. (Robert Shaw, Exposition of WCF 19.1)
This is why WCF 19 states quite plainly:
I. God gave to Adam a law, as a covenant of works, by which he bound him and all his posterity to personal, entire, exact, and perpetual obedience; promised life upon the fulfilling, and threatened death upon the breach of it; and endued him with power and ability to keep it.
II. This law, after his fall, continued to be a perfect rule of righteousness; and, as such, was delivered by God upon mount Sinai in ten commandments, and written in two tables; the first four commandments containing our duty toward God, and the other six our duty to man.
Since God created Adam and Even with “the law of God written in their hearts, and power to fulfill it (WCF 4.2), Adam’s “moral ability” doesn’t detract from the “hypothetical” premise I’ve been advancing (that Adam fulfilled the requirements of God’s law) in any way at all. Nevertheless, as I pointed out before, there’s nothing illogical in drawing a valid conclusion using a hypothetical premise — so the fact that Adam was “ontologically mutable” is still irrelevant to the argument.
Ok, the fact that my “hypothetical” premise (that Adam fulfilled the requirements of God’s law) requires an antecedent “hypothetical” decree in order for the argument to be valid is patently obvious (I didn’t even think it needed to be stated). But so what? How does that alter or detract from anything that I’ve said?
You are correct. I don’t agree that I’m “actually extending Scripture beyond what it warrants.” Nor do I see how you’ve even come close to demonstrating such an assertion. What is clear is that the position I’m defending is classic covenant theology as expressed in the Westminster Standards and most other Reformed traditions, while the position you are defending is not.
While I agree that Adam’s hypothetical obedience would not have been the result of some “autonomous” power within him (not even his disobedience was the result of some “autonomous” power within him), I do not agree that it would have been the result of God’s “grace.” God’s “grace,” properly defined, is His unmerited favor in spite of the demerit of sin, which clearly did not apply to Adam in his pre-Fall state. Therefore, Adam’s obedience would have simply been the result of God’s sovereign providential control (just as his disobedience was). There was no “grace” involved at all.
RBerman said,
May 9, 2008 at 8:45 pm
Joshua, I don’t want to belabor the logic point since it doesn’t impact the theology, but you seem to be confusing the inverse and the contrapositive still.
Proposition: A -> B: “If you eat, you will die.”
Inverse: not A -> not B: “If you do not eat, you will not die (i.e.you will live)”
Converse: B -> A: “If it is the case that you will die, then it is the case that you ate.”
Contrapositive: not B -> not A: “If it is the case that you will live, then it is not the case that you ate.”
Given the truth of the proposition, the contrapositive is necessarily true. The inverse and/or converse of a proposition are not necessarily true, though they might be. If the inverse is true, then the converse is true also, for it is the contrapositive of the inverse.
In the case at hand, as far as we know, all four statements are true. But that’s due to the particulars of the situation (since we are not aware of any other situation that would have resulted in Adam dying), not the rules of logic. If there were some other way for Adam to die then the converse and inverse would no longer be true. Indeed, theologians debate what would have happened if Adam had punched Eve in the nose, or mocked God, or done anything else that would be a sin for us today. The Genesis account doesn’t explicitly address those questions, but that doesn’t stop us from wondering about it.