General Response to Leithart’s Article on Justification, part 2

This post will be mostly about hermeneutics. We will take as our starting point Leithart’s statement about justification language and the Reformers: “The other dimensions of justification (other than the legal act, LK) language have played almost no role in the Protestant formulation of the dogma of justification” (pp. 207-8). Leithart’s basic argument goes like this: the Reformers saw that the relevant word-groups often refer to a courtroom setting (and Leithart does not explicitly deny the courtroom setting definition). Therefore they formulated their doctrine of justification based solely on that legal setting. This truncates to a certain extent the biblical range of use of the word-group. Therefore, we ought to expand our definition of justification to include this broader range of meaning in the relevant word-groups. I believe I have his argument correct. This seems to be indicated by several statements like the following: “As far as it goes, the Protestant doctrine is correct” (p. 209); “The problem is, this is not the only setting for justification in Scripture” (p. 209, emphasis original); “‘justification’ language has a wider and more flexible usage in Scripture than in Protestant systematics” (p. 211).

I bring this up, since it is a crucial part of his argument (indeed, one may well argue that it is the linch-pin). I am going to argue that this is a very sophisticated version of the illegitimate totality transfer fallacy. Most words have a range of meanings. Take the word “lie,” for instance. You could say that I am going to lie down or tell a lie. Another example is “set.” I will set down the computer, and then play a set of tennis. What illegitimate totality transfer does is to import all or most of the meanings that a word has into a particular text. Now, Leithart is not necessarily doing that with individual texts. Rather, he is doing it with the relevant word-groups as it feeds into doctrine. What he is saying is that we need to consider what every meaning of tsadaq means (or dikaiosune), in order to determine our doctrine of justification. The problem here is that systematics does not work on the basis of individual words. Rather, it works with the ideas. Ideas may or may not correspond to the words. Take Genesis 30:33, for instance. I am going to argue (in a future post) that the word there means “integrity” or “honesty.” I think that is the most exegetically defensible position. Does our integrity factor into our doctrine of justification? Not the least little bit. First of all, our “integrity” is as filthy rags. Secondly, it is Christ’s righteousness, not ours, that is the ground of justification. To use language that has been used by some on this blog(hesitantly, since I am not sure I agree with it: I use it more for rhetorical force), Leithart is confusing the levels of discourse here.

60 Comments

  1. Matthew Paul Buccheri said,

    June 22, 2007 at 1:31 pm

    Lane,

    I think Leithart is saying that there’s a depth and richness that has been lost by limiting such words to a merely forensic category and concept. Illegitimate totality transfer does not quite capture the issue here…sorry.

  2. greenbaggins said,

    June 22, 2007 at 1:45 pm

    You could only prove that, Matthew, by saying that the Reformers didn’t have a clue about how these words were used in other contexts. Are you going to suggest that the Reformers didn’t know about these other uses of the relevant word-groups? Supposing, for a minute, they did. Then suppose that they came to the conclusion that only certain definitions are really relevant to the doctrine of justification. Then Leithart’s argument falls to the ground, because he is assuming that the Reformers didn’t take such meanings into account. I am going to argue that they did, but considered them (rightly) irrelevant.

  3. Robert K. said,

    June 22, 2007 at 2:34 pm

    >I think Leithart is saying that there’s a depth and richness that has been lost by limiting such words to a merely forensic category and concept. Illegitimate totality transfer does not quite capture the issue here…sorry.

    Why interact with these people when you get responses like this?

    Notice he leaves this alone: “The problem here is that systematics does not work on the basis of individual words. Rather, it works with the ideas. Ideas may or may not correspond to the words.” The analogy of faith as well. Something about the whole counsel of God as well.

    Notice also the appeal to depth and richness, as if the depth and richness, to use his words, of God’s plan of redemption as elucidated by Reformed Theology is shallow and dull, or, is not enough. God’s Plan is Not Enough. New book, coming soon, by F. V. Genius.

  4. Stewart said,

    June 22, 2007 at 3:06 pm

    Lane, setting Leithart’s position aside for a moment, would you ever grant the possibility that we have not said everything that needs to be said about the doctrine justification? Did the reformers say everything that could possible be said about it? Did the cover everything. Are they fallible? Is it possible that they missed something? And can one ever argue that they might have?

    Your argument seems to be that Leithart must be wrong because that would imply that the Reformers might have possibly missed something or may not have seen a certain angle, and we all no that’s just silly.

  5. greenbaggins said,

    June 22, 2007 at 3:18 pm

    No, Stewart, my argument is not that the Reformers saw everything. My argument will be that they did see quite a bit more than Leithart thinks they saw. And any addition to our knowledge about justification must not involve any denial of what is already there. Leithart, I believe, seriously undermines the Reformational doctrine.

  6. pduggan said,

    June 22, 2007 at 3:26 pm

    I think “set” and “lie” are terrible examples of the kind of thing Leithart is doing. Its more like “healthy” when talking about a healthy person and a healthy sandwich. In that case there is actually a kind of analogy between the health of the one and the other. We’re dealing with the same zone of meaning.

    Lying down and lying scoundrels are homonyms, not analogous terms.

  7. greenbaggins said,

    June 22, 2007 at 3:43 pm

    I disagree utterly, Paul. Take Genesis 30:33, for example. Honesty is simply not the same as righteousness. Integrity is not the same thing as righteousness. And you are not dealing with the substance of the argument, namely, that Leithart is confusing word and concept. Comment 3 is right on target.

  8. pduggan said,

    June 22, 2007 at 3:52 pm

    Um, what? How is that a response to my point that your examples of ITT are wanting?

  9. pduggan said,

    June 22, 2007 at 3:55 pm

    And if I’m honest in a personal dealing, I’ll have a good status with the person as I’d have a good status if I’m court-righteous in court.

    And if I have integrity in a economic transaction, I’ll have a positive economic result analogous to the kind of result I’d have in a court.

  10. greenbaggins said,

    June 22, 2007 at 4:00 pm

    Your counter-examples on honesty and integrity don’t work, since the semantic range of the ways you have used them are way too close together. I’m talking about words that have much different connotations depending on how they are used. Tsadaq, for example, means integrity or honesty when the point of reference is to another person. It means righteousness only in reference to God. What Leithart is doing is importing meanings of *words* into the formulation of *doctrine.* As D.A. Carson has pointed out, they are not operating on the same level. Furthermore, as I shall show, Leithart’s doctrine does not merely add to our knowledge, but actually contradicts the Reformed teaching on justification.

  11. Kelly Kerr said,

    June 22, 2007 at 6:54 pm

    You said, “Ideas may or may not correspond to the words.” How may an idea not correspond to the words? How would you articulate that idea if it doesn’t correspond to any words?

  12. Matthew Paul Buccheri said,

    June 22, 2007 at 8:22 pm

    Again, I’m finding this blog to be an unsafe place for theological banter. For some reason Lane, your blog attracts all types: scholars, idiots and cowards. Maybe we’ll talk more off-line at some point. I really enjoyed our time at GA.

  13. Good Hermaneutics on Green Baggins « Reformed Musings said,

    June 22, 2007 at 11:30 pm

    [...] Hermaneutics on Green Baggins Lane over at Green Baggins is taking up Dr. Leithart’s challenge on justification. Dr. Clark has laid out some excellent [...]

  14. David Gadbois said,

    June 23, 2007 at 3:36 am

    Lane,

    Glad you brought this stuff up. A few weeks ago I wrote to Xon to the same effect:

    “Saying that “justification” has a broader semantic range in both the Hebrew and Greek testaments is a far cry from saying that we should smear Paul’s use of justification/accounting language (which our ST indexes its definitions to) to include non-forensic categories or requires Wilkins’ parallel soteriology (it is light-years away from doing that).”

    As a matter of fact, FV wouldn’t exist if their favorite tactic of conceptual “smearing” was unavailable to them. They pride themselves so much on being so much more sophisticated and nuanced than TRs, yet they have to keep miles away from basic and elementary distinctions that first year seminary students should be aware of.

  15. pduggie said,

    June 23, 2007 at 7:58 am

    “Tsadaq, for example, means integrity or honesty when the point of reference is to another person. It means righteousness only in reference to God.”

    Huh? In exodus 23:7 it has reference to a human evaluation of humans, in a judicial context.

  16. pduggie said,

    June 23, 2007 at 8:20 am

    “Your counter-examples on honesty and integrity don’t work, ”

    How is that a response to my point that your examples of ITT are wanting?

  17. greenbaggins said,

    June 23, 2007 at 9:48 am

    In exodus 23:7, the issue is about whether or not the person is righteous *in the sight of the law.* This is proved by the immediately following context, in which God says “I will not acquit the wicked.” The judges, in other words, yes, in a judicial context, are delegated by God to determine the relationship of the person to God’s law. This is not an example of integrity in one’s dealings with someone else. This has to do with the justice of the law of God.

    Paul, my point is simply that just because words mean different things in different contexts does *not* mean that we have to use all the different meanings of a word in our formulation of doctrine. That is my point. It can be illustrated quite well by homonyms “set” and “lie,” just as well as it can be illustrated by the various meanings of “tsadaq,” all of which are simply not necessary for the formulation of the doctrine of justification.

  18. Thomas Twitchell said,

    June 23, 2007 at 12:48 pm

    I am not a scholar so as an idiot I’ll fire my guns and duck and run like a coward.

    Didn’t David use tsadaq to discribe himself as one who will stand (I take that as justification) in his holiness (tsadaq). Now a review of David’s life and his own characterization of it reveals a man who lacked integrity. David must have had in mind two conceptions of integrity. There were those strivings that David pursued to comform his life to the law of God, at which point he failed misserably. But, he was standing in the sincerity of his strivings and was therefore displaying integrity. David also was aware of the “justification” of holiness that is imputed, not on his account, but because of Christ. We know him for his extensive prophetic picture of that kind of righteousness that is revealed from heaven through faith, a justification not earned, but declared. For this he is declared a man after God’s own heart, not because he had any integrity in his flesh, but through the Spirit, as Paul says in Romans, he served God with his mind. Taking mind to mean the heart or that seat of judgment where Chrsit has taken his permanent domain Paul could say “My conscience is clear, but I am not without guilt (or, I am not innocent).”

    When we apply terms like justification as a means to define truths in Scripture, like any term within Scripture, those terms must be defined narrowly by the context, and at the same time they must conform to the broader context of the full revelation of Scripture. So, the words themselves may not relate directly to the forensic meaning in the lexicon. There is a hermaneutic that is employed, however, that keeps us from going beyond what is possible. The meaning cannot be something that the word cannot mean. And, the particuar meaning cannot negate what is other wise established elsewhere.

    We can take terms like love and find that not only are there several words that are used, but they have particuar application within the context, and a broader application which appliesto the rest of revelation. Jesus’ use of phileo rather than agapeo when addressing Peter is one such use. Broadly, the terms are equivalents, synonomous. Their particular context though has application to the relationship that is being described. In the Scripture, “Do you love me,” phileo has its context in relationship to the Son and his to Peter. It is reflective of “No greater love has any man, than he who would lay down his life for his friends.” Here agape is defined in its demonstrative kind as love for a friend, which is agape for philos, or phileo.

    What I am saying is this. For the “formulation of doctrine,” only those uses that are particular to the relationship that is being established are necessary to convey the idea. Although other instances should be considered in those definitions, they are not always germain to the determination of what that relationship is that is being defined by any particular occurance. First then, we must establish the domain that is the particular relationship that is in view. Then, only those instances that pertain to it are important in the discovery of the parameters of it.

    If I was to determine what I would need for a trip to the desert, it would not be necessary for me to discover all that there is to taking any trip. I would not need to know what I need to go to the North Pole. Only certain aspects of “trip” belong to both, but being rightly equipped to go to the desert is all that pertains to going there.

    That I might find the term tsadaq in the desert does not mean that I am on the North Pole. To assume that because tsadaq is found there, that I must then also equip myself for the North Pole the next time just to go to the desert can only serve to undermine the trip to the desert. It is superfluous baggage that may well endanger my life.

    Well my ammo is spent and not being a scholar with megas ammo, I must retreat in my idiotic cowardly fashion.

    ttfn,

    tt

  19. Robert K. said,

    June 23, 2007 at 1:45 pm

    “I have taken all my good deeds, and all my bad and cast them in a heap before the Lord, and fled from both, and betaken myself to the Lord Jesus Christ, and in him I have sweet peace.” - David Dickson, among his last words, 1600s

  20. Chris Hutchinson said,

    June 23, 2007 at 1:56 pm

    Thomas,

    For a non-scholar, that was pretty good! We need more non-scholars like you!

    Chris H.

  21. reformedmusings said,

    June 23, 2007 at 6:44 pm

    Lane,

    I’ve just posted a 2-part analysis of the intended recipients of some of Paul’s letters on my blog. They take aim at the mistaken concept of the “covenentally elect.” I hope that it supports in some small way your effort on justification. I will continue to read your series with interest as time allows.

  22. pduggie said,

    June 23, 2007 at 8:01 pm

    How is Jesus using “:judge” when he says “Judge not, lest ye be judged”? Same sense? Two different senses? Mutually refinforcing, or hermetically sealed from each other?

  23. pduggie said,

    June 23, 2007 at 8:09 pm

    homonyms are *different words* that may have even entered a language from two different other languages. And if you admit that tzedeq has a general meaning of “uprightness”, which can have a courtroom sense and a personal sense, then in what way is my offered example of healthy sandwhiches and healthy people NOT a better analogy to what you claim leithart is doing.

    You seem to seriously be claiming there is NO *analogy* between “horizontal” human relationships and our vertical relationship. That makes no sense to me.

  24. markhorne said,

    June 23, 2007 at 8:10 pm

    Well, I’ll say this, Reformedmusings: you certainly make Lane look better. I guess that helps.

  25. A. Dollahite said,

    June 24, 2007 at 12:48 am

    Thomas,

    RE: #18. A couple of questions.

    1) You said,

    And, the particuar meaning cannot negate what is other wise established elsewhere.

    With respect to Leithart’s essay, is it your contention that he is defining justification is a way that negates what is other wise established elsewhere? If so, how? If not, nevermind.

    2) You said,

    What I am saying is this. For the “formulation of doctrine,” only those uses that are particular to the relationship that is being established are necessary to convey the idea. Although other instances should be considered in those definitions, they are not always germain to the determination of what that relationship is that is being defined by any particular occurance. First then, we must establish the domain that is the particular relationship that is in view. Then, only those instances that pertain to it are important in the discovery of the parameters of it.

    It would be helpful to me if you would explain how your argument applies to Leithart’s essay on justification. Is it your contention that he is importing meanings of “justification” into the doctrine of justification that are not proper because those meanings of justification are not part of the domain that is particular to the doctrine of justification?

    Thanks.

    P.S. If the formatting is messed up, sorry. I’m experimenting with html tags.

  26. A. Dollahite said,

    June 24, 2007 at 1:01 am

    Mark Horne,

    If you get a chance this week, could you send me an email at adollahite AT gmail DOT com. I have a small question to ask you if you have time.

  27. G.L.W.Johnson said,

    June 24, 2007 at 10:18 am

    Well, I see that Wilson could not restrain himself from ’setting the record straight’ with Bob from Reformed musings-naturally his choir began chirping in unison and admiration in their comments. Really Doug ,is that the best you could do? ‘Look here at the numerical growth of the CREC- obviously the blessings of God-ergo my standing in the CREC is a sign of God’s approval.’ Obviously the same thing could be maded by the Mormons or T.D. Jakes and a host of others with equally ghoulish theology but with spectular growth.
    And then the Thor like claim that Doug would eagerly welcome a really rigorous exchange with the likes of Scott Clark and Mike Horton. If it went anything like the one that Fowler White and Cal Beisner witnessed down at Knox ,it would be a monumental waste of time-watching Wilson spin like a top and fill the air with a lot rhetorical bluster designed to create as much confusion as possible.Scott and Mike have better things to do with their time. Finally, the slavery thing -what an embarassment. Again , however, you will not find Wison acknowledging that he shot himself in the foot more than once on this one-no instead he re-doubles his efforts to convince himself and his faithful followers that he is never in the wrong….. about anything- appearances notwithstanding.Wilson can howl all he wants and he will-but I for one am done having anything to do with him. He is incorrigable.

  28. anneivy said,

    June 24, 2007 at 10:50 am

    Oh dear. Numerical growth?

    That’s the least reliable sign of a ministry/church/denomination being blessed by God, seeing as how Willow Creek is huge, Saddleback is huge, etc.

    Mind, growth ought not to be taken as a sign of divine disfavor, either; after all, both MacArthur and Piper have large, vibrant churches. Fact is, growth doesn’t prove anything either way.

    Be nice if it did, of course! But there….that’d be too easy. ;-)

  29. Xon said,

    June 24, 2007 at 12:15 pm

    Except that “numerical growth=God’s blessing” is not the argument Doug advanced, guys. (Another FV claim to being misread! A crayamba!)

    Wilson was refuting Reformedmusing’s contention that the CREC is nothing but a rubber-stamp for whatever Wilson wants, and that he has no accountability there. He wasn’t trying to prove that God has blessed the CREC by making it grow (though he obviously believes that this is true); he was arguing that the fact that it has grown shows that he does not ‘control’ it with no accountability.

  30. A. Dollahite said,

    June 24, 2007 at 12:17 pm

    Gary,

    I mean this as honestly as I can, but for someone who is done having anything to do with Wilson, you sure do spend a lot of words telling everyone what a disaster Wilson is.

  31. anneivy said,

    June 24, 2007 at 1:03 pm

    Xon, Xon, Xon. Get it right, dear.

    It’s “Aye carumba!” :-D

    I guess I’ll need to break down and go read it for myself, for your explanation doesn’t really hold water. Not blaming you, mind! Not in the least. If that’s what the man said, that’s what the man said. But maybe it was fleshed out some, for I’m at a loss as to how the fact the CREC has grown could be construed as conclusive proof that he doesn’t “control it with no accountability.”

    It’s hardly impossible that a person could control a denomination-of-sorts without accountability yet the DoS still grows like a weed, after all.

  32. Xon said,

    June 24, 2007 at 1:14 pm

    Lane,

    Tsadaq, for example, means integrity or honesty when the point of reference is to another person. It means righteousness only in reference to God.

    This is puzzling as to how it fits into your argument against Leithart. Are you saying that the Hebrews used the same word to have two completely different meanings when talking about humans vs. when talking about God, and intended no connection to be drawn between the two? A. How could you possibly know this?, and B. Why? We’re not talking about a modern language like English that has several linguistic rivers feeding into it for over a thousand years. For the Hebrews to say “Hey, let’s discuss two completely different concepts using the same word, just cuz!” seems unlikely.

    When I read the blockquoted statement of yours above, it makes me think “Huh, God must want us to make a connection between ‘integrity’ and ‘honesty’ and His righteousness. God is like the super-honest man of complete integrity. This is what His “righteousness” is like. Etc.” Otherwise, if we’re not supposed to make this kind of connection between the different uses of ‘tsadaq’, how would we ever know anything about what God is like at all? For instance, what exactly is the concept of divine tsadaq? Can we describe it at all (in fallen, always inadequate human terms, of course)? I don’t see how we could, if the word’s meaning when used to talk about the divine is completely different (and unrelated) than its meaning when used to talk about the human. That would leave us with an understanding of human tsadaq (integrity and honesty), but no idea what divine tsadaq is except a “filler” word for “God’s moral quality that we don’t understand”. ?

  33. Xon said,

    June 24, 2007 at 1:20 pm

    Anne, sure it’s possible, but Wilson wasn’t giving some sort of deductively valid logical syllogism. He was simply deflecting a charge by showing that, while it might be possible, it does not seem very likely. I mean, it’s easy for a person to just say (like reformedmusings said in his blog post against Wilson) that “Wilson formed his own denomination so he could control things and never have to answer for his theology to anyone”, but when you realize that the CREC has become way bigger than Wilson’s neck of the woods over the last ten years this charge should sound rather unlikely. Of course it’s still possible, but Mr. Mattes should not not make charges just b/c they’re possible. It’s possible that I saw Whitney Houston beating the crap out of her kids in the grocery store yesterday, after all. Can’t be sure, but it might have been her. Anyway, when she points out all her credentials as a mother, you could then come along and say “Well, sorry Whitney, but it’s not impossible that you have all those official-sounding credentials for being a good mother, and yet are actually a terrible mother after all.”

    As always, it is not on an accused person to definitively prove that all charges against them are false. The nature of most charges is that this would be impossible. The burden is on the accuser; and Mr. Mattes’s accusation is easy to say based on a lot of surface-level assumptions, but darn hard to substantiatie. And therefore he shouldn’t have said it.

    But Wilson’s self-defense has nothing to do with “We’ve grown, therefore we must be okay in God’s eyes so get off our backs.”

  34. Gentry said,

    June 24, 2007 at 1:47 pm

    Xon writes: “A crayamba!”

    anneivy writes: “Xon, Xon, Xon. Get it right, dear. It’s ‘Aye carumba!’”

    Both of you, get it right. It’s: Ay, caramba!

  35. Gentry said,

    June 24, 2007 at 1:51 pm

    Hmm. I tried posting this earlier, but it didn’t take:

    Robert K. quotes David Dickson: “I have taken all my good deeds, and all my bad and cast them in a heap before the Lord, and fled from both, and betaken myself to the Lord Jesus Christ …”

    I like what Dickson says. But I also think that we have to leave room for what the Spirit says: “Blessed are the dead who die in the Lord … their works follow them.”

  36. reformedmusings said,

    June 24, 2007 at 6:38 pm

    Well, I see that Wilson could not restrain himself from ’setting the record straight’ with Bob from Reformed musings-naturally his choir began chirping in unison and admiration in their comments.

    For myself, I appreciate Doug Wilson’s straight-forward response. He did correctly identify the core issues raised in my post. I said what I had to say based on my research and stand by it, and he responded with his views. We differ, and people can decide for themselves. I actually had hoped that he would repudiate his and Wilkins’ slavery monograph, but he didn’t. Game over.

    I don’t care what his devotees say (haven’t read any of the comments his site), although I do believe that charismatic leadership has a more powerful affect on followers than for which many give it credit until it’s too late. Such leadership consequently carries with it a greater responsibility to keep reigned-in what you create. We’ll see how that goes.

    But Gary, I just followed your home link. I’ve read a lot of your material and thoroughly enjoyed it. Thanks for all that you do for the Christ’s Church.

  37. anneivy said,

    June 24, 2007 at 6:52 pm

    Blast. Is it really? Ay, caramba?

    Well, I was closer, anyway. >;^>

    (Anne takes what she can get.)

  38. Xon said,

    June 24, 2007 at 7:08 pm

    I was working completely off of memory and crude phonetics. No surprise that I butchered it. Oy vey!

  39. jared said,

    June 25, 2007 at 9:55 am

    greenbaggins,

    You say ” that systematics does not work on the basis of individual words. Rather, it works with the ideas.” Where, exactly, do these ‘ideas’ come from if not from words? And if they do come from words then shouldn’t we be looking at all the meanings and usages of those words before we go dogma/doctrine making? This is all that Leithart is asking for: “My point was simply this, If we are going to be fully biblical in our understanding of ‘justification,’ doesn’t the deliverance aspect of justification - which is present in Paul at least in Rom 6:7 and arguably too in Rom 8:1-4 - need to be included in our formulations?”

    You also say “Does our integrity factor into our doctrine of justification? Not the least little bit. First of all, our “integrity” is as filthy rags. Secondly, it is Christ’s righteousness, not ours, that is the ground of justification.” It doesn’t matter that our “integrity” is as filthy rags because those rags are washed by the blood of Christ and are presented to the Father as clean; so our integrity does matter in our doctrine of justification. No one gets through the gates without having a faith that saves, an honest faith, a faith which demands (and results in) integrity. Secondly, no one (certainly not Leithart) is denying that it is Christ’s righteousness which is the ground of our justification. Who else could clean our rags and who else could present them before the Father as clean? But it is equally important that we have them because if we don’t then the gospel isn’t being (or hasn’t been) very effective (or affective).

  40. greenbaggins said,

    June 25, 2007 at 10:09 am

    Jared, my point is this: it is hermeneutically unsound to say that because a word that is used in systematics to define justification is also used in broader senses in Scripture, that therefore we can turn it around and import those other meanings of the word into the systematic construction. That is simply not a valid hermeneutic. By that argument, we could take the Greek word “is,” which in certain contexts means “become” and say that therefore our doctrine of Jesus means that He becomes God. That would be broadening our horizons of belief, wouldn’t it? No, it would be contradicting traditional Christology. The same thing is true with justification. Leithart’s goal is combine justification and definitive sanctification into one act (see _Federal Vision_, pg. 211-212). This denies the traditional definition of justification, which includes *no* part of sanctification, definitive or otherwise, in its definition of justification. Leithart is moving here in a Romanist direction.

    And it is not our rags which are cleansed for our justification. It is Christ’s righteousness which is imputed to us. Roman Catholics wouldn’t deny that Christ’s righteousness becomes ours, either. But on this pivotal issue, Roman Catholics believe that justification involves infusion, not imputation.

  41. Xon said,

    June 25, 2007 at 10:14 am

    Yes, Lane, for the record I ‘jive’ with Jared’s comment.

    Leithart looks at passages like romans 6:7 and 8:1-4 and sees a “deliverance” aspect to those passages. And those passages use the word “justification”/”righteousness.” Are you saying that we must form a “doctrine of justification” without at least taking into consideration all the Biblical usages of the word “justification”? ??

    “Oh, sure, that passage uses the word ‘justification’ to speak about a situation in which deliverance is a major component of what is going on, but in that passage ‘justification’ is being used in a way completely foreign to the ‘real’ doctrinal idea of justification that we are interested in. Not every meaning of a word has to be included in your conceptual doctrine, after all.” This seems like special pleading, and it also seems like a hopeless epistemological maze. How on earth do we determine, on the front end, which usages of “justification” are applicable to a proper doctrine of justification and which ones are not?

    I mean, Leithart isn’t saying that we just insert every single occurrence of ‘justification’ or ‘righteousness’ into our doctrine, no questions asked. If, for example, there were Bill and Teds in the NT era who wrote a letter to the church at San Demas and they kept calling everything “righteous”, we would be able to tell from context that those occurrences of “righteous” mean “cool, excellent, tubular, bodacious” and have nothing to do with how a person is made right with God. Fine, and good, and I don’t see where Leithart would disagree with that sort of obvious point. But these uses of “tsadaq’ aren’t like this–they are not obviously unrelated to the proper doctrine of justification. Who says that “integrity” and “honesty” don’t have anything to do with how God gives us a righteous status in His sight? This cannot simply be asserted (though I realize you have more posts left, but it seemed as though you are going to move on from this point which is why I am questioning it now instead of waiting for the later posts.) And in the Pauline passages Leithart talks about it’s even more unclear how Leithart could be mistaken. These passages use the word “jutification,” so if someone asks “What does the Bible say about justification?” how can we not take a look at these passages and see what they have to say? Again, if they turn out to say something completely unrelated to our general concept of doctrinal justification–like in my silly Bill and Ted example–then that’s fine and we would be able to tell this from the context. But Leithart’s whole point would be that this is not happening in these passages in Romans (for example). Here “righteousness”/”justification” language is used to describe a deliverance, and so it seems like deliverance should figure more promienntly into our doctrine of justification if we want to be faithful to the Scriptures. What a priori reason is there to preclude the deliverance aspect of these words from the “proper” doctrine?

  42. Xon said,

    June 25, 2007 at 10:16 am

    And having now read your #40, Lane, I think my #41 still isn’t answered. (I’m sure you’ll get to it)

  43. greenbaggins said,

    June 25, 2007 at 10:23 am

    Xon, I think your concerns will be dealt with as I go through the exegetical issues of each passage.

  44. Xon said,

    June 25, 2007 at 10:29 am

    Okay, that’s fair enough. Except….

    If refuting Leithart is just a matter of going through each passage one-by-one and showing where his argument fail, then what happened to the main contention of this post: that Leithart errs by utilizing some general exegetical rule that says we can plug any and all occurrences of a word into our doctrine? Leithart might not be using such a rule at all, but simply believes in all sincerity that various passages are relevant to our doctirne of justification. Not relevant becuase they have to be by virtue of this mistaken exegetical rule that you accuse him of using; but relevant becuase of the particular features of the passages themselves. At this point, you would stil need to refute Leithart by going through the passages one-by-one, but you would need to drop the charge that he’s guilty of using this misguided rule. I hope the problem I’m having is clear.

  45. greenbaggins said,

    June 25, 2007 at 10:34 am

    Well, Xon, I think that the examination of the various passages will show the truth of this post. In other words, when I think he is doing what this post claims he is doing, I plan on pointing that out. It is not as if these two introductory posts are going to be left behind in the remainder of the posts. Hope this helps.

  46. Xon said,

    June 25, 2007 at 10:40 am

    But how would you come to a particular passage x, and then “show” that Leithart interprets it the way he does because he’s using this bad exegetical rule you worry about in this post?

    If my friend tells me he say a unicorn down at Sanford Stadium, and I look into it and decide that he was mistaken, that doesn’t mean that I can then say, “See, this proves that my friend is just gullible about all fairy tales he hears. He accepts at face value all stories about fantastic creatures.” This is not nexessarily true at all. Maybe my friend just really did think he saw a unicorn in this particular case, even though he is generally skeptical of such fantasies.

    How are you going to go from “Leithart misreads this passage” to “Leithart misreads this passage because he is utilizing the bad hermeneutical rule I pointed out in Post #2 in this series”? That’s my question.

  47. Paul B said,

    June 25, 2007 at 11:03 am

    “Most words have a range of meanings. Take the word ‘lie,’ for instance. You could say that I am going to lie down or tell a lie.”

    To transfer the meaning of “lie” in “I am going to lie down” to the meaning of “lie” in “tell a lie” would be an illegitimate transfer indeed. These two phrases do not show that “[m]ost words have a range of meaning,” for “lie” and “lie,” despite appearances, are not even within the same word group. As a quick trip to Webster’s shows, they’re completely different words.

    The “lie” in “I am going to lie down” can be traced to the Old English “licgan,” which is akin to the Old High German “ligen,” which means “to lie” in the sense of reclining; “lectus” is the Latin for “bed,” and “lechos” is the Greek.

    The “lie” in “tell a lie” can be traced to the Old English “lyge,” which is “lie” in the sense of “a falsehood intended to deceive.”

  48. pduggan said,

    June 25, 2007 at 11:30 am

    Wouldn’t everyone agree that when God declares the verdict “not guilty”, the justified one is at the same time and by the declaration out from under the wrath of God?

    If so, then God has stopped being wrathful towards the sinner.

    That has to have concrete consequences, like God has stopped “giving over” sinners to “more sin”

  49. greenbaggins said,

    June 25, 2007 at 12:07 pm

    Paul B, most people do not know the etymology of those words. So, if you want to pick apart my analogy, you can do it. That isn’t my point. My point is that words have a range of meaning, and that they cannot be willy-nilly applied to a concept. Words and concepts, though inseparable, are yet distinct. Confusing them is a very bad mistake, as D.A. Carson notes well in his book _Exegetical Fallacies_, a book which should be required reading for every hermeneutics course in existence. If you don’t like my examples, you can go with a different example, such as “enough,” which means different things depending on whether one is saying, “I’ve had enough!” (in the context of a kid taking a beating, in which case the metaphorical meaning is equal to “too much”), versus “No thank you, I’ve had enough” (in the context of a meal, where the metaphorical meaning is “I have had sufficient for my needs”).

  50. Xon said,

    June 25, 2007 at 12:24 pm

    But Lane, let’s keep looking at this.

    If someone wanted to formulat a “doctrine of enoughness”, we would first ask, “Okay, what, broadly, do you mean by ‘enoughness’?” That would give us the basic conceptual range that we are looking for. Once that was established, we could look through the primary text and find all references to the concept. And this might require us to discard a few usages of the word ‘enough’ itself, if those usages are outside the conceptual range we are looking for regarding our doctrine of enoughness.

    Likewise, we ask, “What, broadly, do you mean by ‘justification’ when you say that you want to formulate a doctrine of justification?” You actually haven’t answered this yet in these posts, but I presume you would say something like “being declared righteous in God’s courtroom”, or something like that. Okay, so that establishes our basic conceptual range that we are looking for–now we can comb through the Bible looking for all places, regardless of what particular words are used here or there, where the Bible gives us information about this concept “being declared righteous in God’s courtroom.” All of these passages, taken together, should inform our “doctrine of justification.” If there is a usage of the word “justification” in the Bible which has nothing to do with “being declared righteous in God’s courtroom,” then we can disregard that particular passage in formulating our doctrine. So far so good. But where does Leithart even question the propriety of this basic procedure?

    Leithart thinks, clearly, that the passages of Scripture which use “justification” words to talk about deliverance are still in the conceptual range we are looking for–i.e., deliverance contributes to our understanding of the concept “being declared righteous in God’s courtroom.” Therefore, Leithart argues, a properly and fully Biblical “doctrine of justification” must include this aspect of deliverance found in these passages.

  51. jared said,

    June 25, 2007 at 12:36 pm

    greenbaggins,

    Thanks for the clarification. I haven’t read the book you reference or the article that Leithart refers to so I’m sort of shooting in the dark here (well, not completely because I think I get the gist from his blog). I don’t see where Leithart is trying to combine justification and definitive sanctification. I think he would make a distinction between justification (being declared righteous and, in his understanding-in-development, being delivered from condemnation via this declaration) and definitive sanctification (being made righteous). I certainly don’t see what is Romanist about that.

    Also, I certainly agree with you that Christ’s imputed righteousness is the ground of our justification. However, it is also the case that this imputed righteousness necessitates the possession, and obligates the presentation, of filthy rags. The cleaning of our filthy rags is definitive (and ongoing) sanctification and the presentation of Jesus’ clean rag, in the place of our dirty ones, is justification. Leithart isn’t “willy-nilly” using just any meaning of justification, rather his concern is that the biblical concept of justification as it relates to our salvation (from sin and death and all that) hasn’t been fully been worked out in traditional Reformed Systematics. This is not to say that the traditional view is wrong, just that it isn’t complete (and likely never will be on this side of heaven).

  52. greenbaggins said,

    June 25, 2007 at 1:06 pm

    Whatever Leithart is saying, he is certainly not saying what you just said he said. Here is a direct quotation:

    “justification and definitive sanctification are not merely simultaneous, nor merely twin effects of the single event of union with Christ (though I believe that is the case). Rather, they are the same act. God’s declaration that we are justified *takes the form of* deliverance from sin, death, and Satan (emphasis original, from _Federal Vision_, pp. 211-212).

    This says the exact opposite of what you said he says.

  53. Paul B said,

    June 25, 2007 at 2:43 pm

    Pastor Lane, I’m not just picking apart your analogy (”tell a lie,” “lie down”); I’m saying it’s misleading, though you don’t intend to mislead. Pastor Leithart may be right, or he may be wrong, but I doubt that he has done anything so egregious as transferring the meaning of one word to another that isn’t even etymologically related. Again, “tell a lie” and “lie down” don’t show us that words have a range of meaning, for in this case they are completely different words. I don’t think that’s so with the words at issue in Pastor Leithart’s essay.

  54. Xon said,

    June 25, 2007 at 2:50 pm

    Paul, for what it’s worth I understood your point perfectly well from the beginning. But, I think Lane’s response could just be that he was picking a stark example of the same “word” having different meanings in order for illustrative purposes. Technically you are right and his example is a bit too stark–it’s not even the same word, but two homonyms. But, I think the point he is trying to make by way of the example is clear enough.

    But, this all just begs the question of whether Leithart actually does what Lane accuses him of doing. I don’t see any evidence of that, personally, no matter what example Lane chooses for an analogy.

  55. greenbaggins said,

    June 25, 2007 at 2:53 pm

    Xon and Paul B, I would answer in this way:

    Doctrine, of necessity, has to be narrower than the range of possible meanings of a word. The doctrine of justification is narrower than the possible meanings of tsedeq and dikaioo. But the correspondent has to be true also: the concept is not limited to any one group of words. Leithart seems to be assuming that we need to take into account all (or most) the meanings of tsedeq in order to formulate the doctrine. What this means is that he has tied the concept of justification to the word tsedeq way too closely. This is not a valid hermeneutical move. The concept of justification is not tied down to any one word.

    The Protestant doctrine of justification by faith simply doesn’t include definitive sanctification or any other kind of sanctification. It simply does not. So, when Leithart uses this hermeneutic to change our doctrine of justification, when the whole point of the Reformation was to keep justification and sanctification distinct, means that Leithart has departed from Reformed orthodoxy. See comment 52 for how he does this. There is *nothing* clear in the Reformation if it is not that justification and sanctification are distinct, yet inseparable. But against Rome, the emphasis was on its distinct character.

  56. Xon said,

    June 25, 2007 at 3:18 pm

    Leithart seems to be assuming that we need to take into account all (or most) the meanings of tsedeq in order to formulate the doctrine. What this means is that he has tied the concept of justification to the word tsedeq way too closely. This is not a valid hermeneutical move. The concept of justification is not tied down to any one word.

    But what about what I said up in # 41? To wit:

    Leithart isn’t saying that we just insert every single occurrence of ‘justification’ or ‘righteousness’ into our doctrine, no questions asked. If, for example, there were Bill and Teds in the NT era who wrote a letter to the church at San Demas and they kept calling everything “righteous”, we would be able to tell from context that those occurrences of “righteous” mean “cool, excellent, tubular, bodacious” and have nothing to do with how a person is made right with God. Fine, and good, and I don’t see where Leithart would disagree with that sort of obvious point. But these uses of “tsadaq’ aren’t like this–they are not obviously unrelated to the proper doctrine of justification. Who says that “integrity” and “honesty” don’t have anything to do with how God gives us a righteous status in His sight? This cannot simply be asserted.

    If there is a usage of the word “justification” in the Bible which has nothing to do with “being declared righteous in God’s courtroom,” or whatever the precise concept of “Justification” you are looking for happens to be, then we can disregard that particular passage in formulating our doctrine. Right on. But this cannot be seen of any usage of “justification” words until you actually look at the passage itself that contains the questionable usage. This is a passage-by-passage kind of fight, not an a priori “Leithart has a bad hermeneutical principle” kind of fight.

    In other words, usages of “justification” which fall outside the desired semantic range for our doctrine of justification will be obvious from the context of the passage. There is no other way to determine whether or not it is outside the semantic range. On this point, Leithart says that tsedeq in Gen. 31 (for instance) is within the proper range to contribute to a proper and Biblical doctrine of justification. You say it is outside that range. Okay, so this is a disagreement; but it has nothing to do with Leithart using a “bad hermeneutical principle” that says that all meanings of a word must be inserted into our doctrinal formulations.

    As to whether your exegeitcal argument against Leithart in the Jacob-Laban passage holds up, see comments under that post. :-)

  57. Brian Kimmel said,

    June 25, 2007 at 3:26 pm

    Re: #52
    There’s nothing in that quote that contradicts the Protestant doctrine of justification. To say that a declaration takes a particular form does not in any way imply that the form is the ground in part or in whole of the declaration. There is not contradiction between saying that the ground of justification is Christ’s righteousness plus nothing and that justification takes the form of definitive sanctification. Which makes them distinct aspects of the same act without confusing them or wrongly attributing the ground of justification to the change which is the declaration.

  58. jared said,

    June 25, 2007 at 3:42 pm

    greenbaggins,

    Once again, thanks for the clarification and the quote (since I don’t have the book yet). I never said he wasn’t trying to combine justification and definitive sanctification into the same act, just that he isn’t equating the two as you seem to believe he is doing. I think he is, indeed, keeping justification and sanctification distinct, just not as particular and individual acts (plural) of God, but rather as the result of one redeeming act. I think if you asked him that’s what he would say, though the quote certainly (and unfortunately) gives the impression that he wants to equate them. Leithart, in the quote you’ve given, admits that justification and definitive sanctification are (but are not merely) “simultaneous… twin effects” which tells me he does draw a distinction between them while seeing them as the same act. Essentially, is Leithart not saying that justification and sanctification, while they are distinct (and simultaneous) they are also inseparable as this one redeeming act of God?

  59. pduggan said,

    June 25, 2007 at 4:10 pm

    Wouldn’t everyone agree that when God declares the verdict “not guilty”, the justified one is at the same time and by the declaration out from under the wrath of God?

  60. Index to Leithart Posts « Green Baggins said,

    October 22, 2007 at 4:19 pm

    [...] 1 (General observations, part 1), part 2 (General observations, part 2), part 3 (Exegetical response, part 1), part 4 (Exegetical respons, [...]

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